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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines Cuban-Soviet relations from 1959
to the present and demonstrates that there has been no
consistent "move toward homogeneity of Cuban and Soviet
^foreign policy aims as a result of Soviet manipulation of
Cuba.
Although the two nations have cooperated and
supported one another on several occasions, there have also
been many occasions when Cuban and Soviet objectives and
ideologies were in direct conflict, especially concerning
support for armed communist struggle in the Third World and
the need for significant economic restructuring in communist
nations.
Citing specific examples of Cuba's autonomous
foreign policy and divergence of Cuban and Soviet foreign
policy goals, this thesis argues against popular theories
which maintain that Soviet influence and economic control
over Cuba has allowed the Soviet Union to dominate Cuban
foreign policy.
This thesis divides the evolution of Cuban-Soviet
relations into five distinct eras.
Chapter one examines
relations from Castro's victory in 1959 to Khrushchev's fall
from power in 1964.
Chapter two explores the breakdown of
Cuban-Soviet relations from 1964 to the Soviet invasion of
Czechoslovakia in 1968.
Chapter three examines renewed
accommodation in Cuban-Soviet relations beginning with
Castro's support of the Soviet invasion and continued
improvement through the middle of the 1970s as a result of
shared foreign policy concerns.
Chapter four reviews CubanSoviet relations from 1975 to the beginning of Gorbachev's
rule in 1985.
Chapter five examines the dramatic changes in
Cuban-Soviet relations which have taken place during the
first six years of Mikhail Gorbachev's administration,
particularly the sweeping reforms that Gorbachev has
proposed for Soviet economic and foreign policies.
These
changes threaten to destroy the Cuban-Soviet rapprochement
that was built over the past two and a half decades.
The
chapter will examine changes in Soviet strategy,
particularly those changes which were directly influenced by
the Soviet Union's relationship with Cuba, Castro's reaction
to these changes, and possible directions for the future of
Cuban-Soviet relations.

AN ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CUBA AND
THE SOVIET UNION: 1959 - 1990

Introduction

Since Lenin consolidated power in the Soviet Union in
the 1920s, Soviet foreign policy has followed a two-track
course of establishing state-to-state relations while also
emphasizing support for revolution and native communist
parties.1

Although state-to-state relations are a standard

feature of any nation's foreign policy, support for native
communist parties and the promotion of revolutions of
national liberation are features which were, in the 1920s,
unique to Soviet foreign policy.

These antagonistic

policies frequently undermined the Soviet leadership's
ability to establish normal relations with many nations in
Europe and throughout the world.

Although more recent

Soviet leaders have de-emphasized official Soviet support
for international communist parties and Marxist revolutions
since they impede the Soviet Union's drive toward peaceful
coexistence with other nations, the Soviet Constitution of
1977 clearly affirmed, "The USSR's foreign policy is aimed
at ensuring favorable international conditions for building
communism in the USSR, protecting the Soviet Union's state

1 Eusebio Mujal-Leon, The USSR and Latin America
(Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1989), xvi.
2

3
interests, strengthening the positions of world socialism,
supporting the peoples' struggle for national liberation and
social progress, preventing wars of aggression, achieving
general and complete disarmament, and consistently
implementing the principle of peaceful coexistence of states
with different social systems."2
Despite the relative rigidity of Soviet domestic
politics, Soviet foreign policy has demonstrated the ability
to adapt to the ever-changing conditions underlying
relations with other nations.

Soviet leaders since Lenin

have stressed the importance of an organic foreign policy
able to adjust to the changing nature of the international
system, a system which has distinctive characteristics
shaped by the goals and actions of competing socioeconomic
systems and by the "correlation of forces" among nations.3
However, it was not until the end of World War II that the
Soviet leadership saw any realistic possibility of bringing
about international socialist revolutions without provoking
dangerous retaliations from the capitalist powers.

Although

Marxism-Leninism recognizes the importance of revolution,,
particularly revolution resulting from class conflict, it

2 From "The Fundamental Law of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics," as quoted in Robert Sharlet, The New
Soviet Constitution of 1977: Analysis and Text (Brunswick,
OH: King's Court Communications, 1978), 85.
3 Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman, eds., Soviet
Foreign Policy in A Changing World (New York, NY: Aldine de
Gruyter, 1986), xvii.

manctetes^that-tensionsshould^bekept within limits and not
be permitted to involve Soviet foreign policy in high-risk
military conflicts or in "adventurist” undertakings,.4

As a

result, Stalin sought to consolidate within the Soviet camp
only those nations which the United States and Britain
recognized as falling within the Soviet sphere.

He avoided

any direct Soviet interference in Western Europe and
immediately sought to shield Eastern Europe behind a veil of
secrecy in order to conceal the vulnerability and
instability of the Soviet Union and its satellite nations.
The consolidation of Eastern European nations marked the
Soviet Union*s first move toward establishing a community of
communist nations.
Whereas the Soviet Union has been opposed to engaging
in armed conflict with the United States and Western Europe,
it was quick to resort to military intervention to prevent
the withdrawal of Eastern European nations from the Soviet
camp.

Moscow authorized the use of military intervention in

East Germany in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Czechoslovakia in
1968, as well as "indirect intervention" in Poland in
1981.5

Malcom Macintosh argues that Soviet interests in

Eastern Europe were founded on military and security motives
4 Michael Curtis, Introduction to Comparative
Politics. (New York, NY: Harper Collins Publishers, 1990),
382.
5 F. Stephen Larrabee, "Soviet Policy Toward Eastern
Europe: Interests, Instruments and Trends," from R. Laird
and E. Hoffman, 531.

5
backed by few, if any, ideological considerations.6
Eastern Europe created a buffer zone between the Soviet
Union and Western Europe, provided space for Soviet military
deployment and maneuvers away from Soviet soil, thereby
enabling Moscow to launch a lightning offensive against
NATO, and supplied the Soviet military with a potential
reserve of troops in the event of a large-scale armed
conflict.
In addition, Communist Eastern Europe proved an
effective diplomatic bloc which customarily supported Soviet
initiatives and positions in the United Nations and other
international organizations.

In order to reward the

allegiance of Eastern European nations and ensure their
continued loyalty, the Soviet Union developed a complex
system of economic interdependence which generally
benefitted the client state.

Although the early economic

relationship between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
favored the Soviets, this trend was reversed in the years
following Stalin's death.

From the 1960s up until the late

1980s, the Soviet Union was paying an increasingly steep
price to maintain its domination over Eastern Europe and
other client states.7

This use of economic assistance and

6 Malcom Macintosh, "Military Considerations in
Soviet-East European Relations," in Karen Dawisha, ed.,
Soviet-East European Dilemmas (New York, NY: Holmes and
Meier, 1981), 136-137.
7

Ibid.

6
trade subsidies proved effective in attracting
underdeveloped nations to the Soviet camp and establishing
Soviet influence within those nations.
By the 1950s the Soviet Union had begun to see itself
as a world power and wanted to increase its influence around
the globe.

David Albright argues that the Soviet leadership

realized that "a superpower does not automatically qualify
as a global power ... such a power must be able to
demonstrate global reach."8

Thus, Moscow realized the

importance of creating allies among Third World nations in
Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America.

The

Korean War highlighted the ideological struggle being played
out in the Third World.

The Soviets characterized the

competition between capitalism and communism as a zero-sum
game, in which advances of one side represented losses for
the other.

Consequently, the Soviets sought to limit

Western influence in the Third World while firmly
establishing their own presence in underdeveloped nations.9
The Soviet Union faced an additional opponent in the
Third World —

the Peoples Republic of China.

A rift

developed between the Soviet Union and China in the 1950s.
Although the two nations had experienced regular clashes as
a result of an enduring disagreement over borders, the
8 David E. Albright, "Latin America in Soviet Third
World Strategy: The Political Dimensions," in E. Mujal-Leon,
12 .
9

Ibid., 15.

7
confrontation worsened when Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong
engaged in an ideological rivalry.

Khrushchev sought to

liberalize and reform Soviet communism following the death
of Stalin.

Mao, who was trying to strengthen China*s

ideological commitment to communism, openly opposed
Khrushchev's reforms.

The dispute carried over into the

international arena, where it developed into a struggle
between the two nations to determine which ideology was to
guide the formulation of international communist policy,
particularly regarding communist movements in the Third
World.10
China had limited success in attracting Third World
allies with its promise of military support for communist
revolution.

Most underdeveloped nations opted for the

economic support offered by the Soviets.

However, in

reaction to expanding Soviet influence in Africa and Latin
America throughout the 1960s and 1970s, China abandoned its
earlier effort to cloak itself in the mantle of a militant
revolutionary power and attempted to highlight its
commitment to economic development.11

In 1982 the General

Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party asserted that
"socialist China belongs to the Third World for it has
experienced the same sufferings of most other Third World

10 Harry Gelman, "Soviet Policy Toward China," in R.
Laird and E. Hoffman, 672.
11

D. Albright, 17.

8
countries, and...is faced with similar problems and
tasks."12

Yet despite its attempts to achieve broader

appeal among underdeveloped nations, China's influence
remained restricted to Asia.
Although China never proved to be a major threat to
Soviet influence in the Third World, the United States did.
The United States developed considerable interests in Asia
and the Middle East, but its most uncontested sphere of
influence was Latin America.

Indeed, Latin America, as the

Third World region furthest from the Soviet Union and
nearest to the United States, has traditionally been a low
priority area for the Soviet Union.

Moscow approached any

initiatives in the region with considerable restraint.

This

was due, in part, to the unwillingness of Soviet leaders to
jeopardize Soviet-American relations by instituting Soviet
ties with Latin American communist parties.

Americans had

come to accept the existence of a communist party in the
United States, especially since it was relatively obscure
and exercised no influence over American policy.

However,

an actual communist government in the Western hemisphere was
not welcome.

As a result, the Soviet Union refused to offer

overt support to potentially successful communist parties in
the region.

For example, when the Mexican Communist Party

12 Hu Yaobang, "Report to the Twelfth Chinese
Communist Party Congress, September 1982," as recorded in
"Create a New Situation in All Fields of Socialist
Modernization," Beiiina Review (September 13, 1982), 29.

9
had the opportunity to achieve some degree of political
influence in Mexico in 1933, the Soviets offered no
assistance knowing that it would create tensions with the
United States.13

Even the Soviet press, the mouthpiece for

political propaganda of international communism, failed to
report fully on the activities of Latin American communists.
Soviet neglect of Latin America continued during the
reign of Stalin, who had little interest in establishing
diplomatic and economic relations with the remote nations of
Latin America.14

However, as the Soviets began to seek

strategic parity with the United States in the 1950s and
Khrushchev succeeded Stalin as chairman of the CPSU, Soviet
leaders began to reassess the importance of the region to
Soviet Cold War strategy.15

Moscow's attempts to establish

relations with Latin American nations proved slow and
difficult.

By 1960, the Soviets had established ties with

only three Latin American governments, in Brazil, Argentina,
and Cuba.
Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military activity in
the region expanded dramatically throughout the 1960s and
1970s.

Relying heavily on Cuba as an ally and, frequently,

13 Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet
Foreign Policy. 1917-1973 (New York, NY: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, Inc., 1974), 645.
14 Nicola Miller, Soviet Relations with Latin America:
1959-1987 (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press,
1989), 5.
15

Ibid.
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a front for Soviet expansionism in the region, the Soviets
initiated contacts with several Latin American nations.
Many of these nations recognized the immediate benefits of
relations with the Soviet Union since even a low-key
relationship could be economically and politically
profitable in an international system dominated by the two
superpowers.16

In exchange, the Soviet Union advocated the

participation of communist parties and other leftist parties
in the native governments.

Where successfully integrated,

as in Mexico and eventually Argentina and Brazil, communist
parties helped to ensure strong relations between the Soviet
Union and Latin American nations.

As a result of improved

relations with Latin American democracies, the Soviet Union
was afforded a legitimate voice in the affairs of the region
and the Third World.
Mark Katz and other scholars have argued that Soviet
support for native communist parties was the most effective
means for securing Soviet influence in Latin America and the
Third World.17

He asserts that the creation of a

disciplined vanguard party along the lines of MarxistLeninist precepts fulfills the need for a strong centralized
government found in many Latin American societies.

The

communists, when properly organized and established, can
16 William H. Luers, "The Soviets and Latin America,"
The Washington Quarterly. 7, no. 1 (Winter 1984), 9.
17 See Mark Katz, The Third World in Soviet Military
Thought (London, England: Croom Helm, 1982).
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replace military and oligarchical governments throughout the
Third World.

Supporters of this perspective concede that

when a communist regime replaces a military regime, the
military may remain closely tied to the new communist
government.

The military helps to ensure the survival of

the communist government until mass support for the party
can be established.

Such was the case with Cuba, the Soviet

Union*s most visible and enduring ally in Latin America.
This alliance cost the Soviets dearly.

By 1989 the

Soviet Union was spending an average of $50 billion per
annum to secure Cuban friendship, Cuban-Soviet trade, and
Soviet military installations on the island.18

This amount

was guaranteed through direct Soviet economic assistance to
Cuba, Soviet subsidies of Cuban exports, and Soviet military
shipments to Cuba.

In order for the Soviet Union to agree

to such a high cost for relations with a small island
nation, the Soviets must have expected meaningful benefits
in return.
In the early 1960s, the Soviets were most concerned
with establishincL^stratecric-parity-, with the United States.
Cuba was the first nation in the region that publicly sought
Soviet cooperation in liberating itself from American
dominance.

Although Khrushchev was attentive to the

maintenance of stable U.S.-Soviet relations, he decided to

18 George Black, "Fidel Holds Fast,” The Nation
(January 1, 1990), 5.

12
take advantage of the inherent opportunities to be derived
from positive relations with Cuba.

The island occupied the

perfect location for maintaining a constant threat to the
United States and its hegemony in the region.

Castro's

position seemed stable and his celebrated charisma ensured
popular support for the regime.

The revolutionary

government was vocally "anti-imperialist” from the beginning
and later claimed a strong commitment to "internationalist
duty and solidarity."19

Each of these qualities encouraged

Soviet interest in Cuba.
Khrushchev and subsequent Soviet leaders saw Cuba as
fulfilling three significant roles: first, as an anti
imperialist sounding_board committed to the erosion of the
United States' historical predominance in the region?
second, as a base for support of future communist movements
in Latin America; and third, as the Soviet Union's primary
spokesman for and contact with other Third World nations.20
As the relationship progressed, the Soviet Union began
initiating military agreements with Cuba which were intended
to strengthen the Soviet threat to American security along
the southern coast of the United States.

The Soviets also

recognized Cuba as an eager ally in military operations
19 W. Raymond Duncan, The Soviet Union and Cuba:
Interests and Influences (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers,
1985), 191-192.
20 Timothy Ashby, The Bear in the Back Yard: Moscow's
Caribbean Strategy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987),
xi.
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throughout the Third World.

But it was Cuba's role as a

source of antagonism for the United States and a source Of
influence in the Third World that the Soviets most wanted to
maintain.

However, the Soviets were committed to

maintaining a strong alliance with Cuba only as long as it
did not jeopardize their fundamental relationship With the
United States*

Soviet foreign policy stressed the primacy

of peaceful coexistence with the United States and its
Western European allies.

Therefore, any relationship that

threatened to undermine this peace was unacceptable to the
Soviet leadership.
Immediately following Fidel Castro's revolutionary
victory over Fulgencio Batista it was not evident in which
direction Castro was planning to take Cuba.

Castro

inherited an island whose fate had been closely guarded,
since 1898 by the United States to maintain regional
stability and protect extensive American business interests
on the island.21

Cuba's foreign policy was also dominated

by the United States.

American hegemony made it difficult

for Batista to establish strong relations with most other

21 The United States won Cuba's independence from the
Spanish in 1898.
In 1989, a treaty between Spain and the
United States made the island an independent republic under
U.S. protection. The U.S. occupation, which ended in 1902,
introduced large-scale American investment in Cuba.From 1906
to 1909 invoked the Platt Amendment, amendments to the Cuban
constitution that gave the United States the right to
intervene in Cuba's domestic affairs. The United States
also intervened in Cuban internal affairs in 1912, 1917, and
1933 to restore order and protect American interests.

14
nations, particularly with nations unfriendly to the United
States.

Most of Cuba's relations were based upon the sale

of sugar, the island's primary export.

Cuba sold sugar to

the United States, most Latin American nations, several
European nations, and the Soviet Union.22
Castro's primary goals upon seizing power from the
U.S.-backed dictator were to ensure his government's and the
island's security.

Edward Gonzalez identifies four "minimum

interests" which guided Castro's early actions as head of
the revolutionary government.23

First, Castro sought to

enhance his political power base in Cuba by placing loyal
supporters in key governmental positions and gaining the
support of the military and major political parties.
Second, he worked to assure his regime's security vis-a-vis
the United States.

Because of his fear of U.S. intervention

against his government, Castro encouraged Soviet strategic
interest in the region.

Third, Castro tried to develop

Cuba's role as an independent actor, despite its close
relationship with the Soviet Union.

Although Castro

welcomed opportunities to support Soviet foreign policy
strategy, he was not willing to blindly follow nor applaud
Soviet policies which proved contrary to Cuba's own

22 Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make the World Safe for
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989),
5.
23 Edward Gonzalez, "The Cuban and Soviet Challenge in
the Caribbean Basin," Orbis (Spring 1985), 75.
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interests.

And fourth, Castro wanted to obtain sufficient

levels of economic assistance to promote the island's
development.

Castro worked hard to ensure sufficient Soviet

financial assistance to furnish Cubans with an elevated
standard of living and high education and literacy rates as
compared to those of other Third World nations.
Gonzalez also argues that the relationship that
developed between Cuba and the Soviet Union has encouraged
Castro to establish a "maximalist strategy" of foreign
policy.

Contained in this strategy are nationalist foreign

policy objectives which encouraged Castro to establish
strong ties with the Soviet Union to help secure these
objectives.

They include: promoting the Third World

struggle against "imperialism" in order to erode the global
power of the United States; extending Cuba's influence in
the Third World through an active diplomatic, political,
technical, and military-security presence in the region;
promoting the rise of radical-left or Marxist-Leninist
regimes in the Caribbean Basin through armed struggle in
order to form a core of radical states closely aligned with
Cuba; and increasing Cuba's power potential, politically and
militarily, through the infusion of higher levels of Soviet
military and economic assistance.24

As Gonzalez points

out, these objectives could only be achieved through active
political, military, and economic collaboration with the
24

Ibid.
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Soviet Union.
There are several theories of Cuban-Soviet relations
which argue that Castro's Cuba is merely a proxy of Soviet
foreign policy.

Both the "Surrogate Thesis of Cuban

Globalism"25 and later the "Sovietization of Cuba Thesis"26
argue that Cuban dependency on Soviet economic and military
assistance has eroded Castro's ability to pursue an
independent foreign policy.

Many scholars have argued that

the Soviet Union dictates Cuban domestic and foreign policy
and slowly has been transforming Cuba into a society more
compatible with Soviet society.

While it is true that

"

,
f

Castro has become dependent on direct Soviet assistance and
favorable trade agreements with the Soviet Union, he has
proven himself an independent actor in international
affairs.
The purpose of this paper is to examine Cuban-Soviet
relations from 1959 to the present and show that there has
been no consistent move toward homogeneity of Cuban and
Soviet foreign policy aims as a result of Soviet
manipulation of Cuba.

Although the two nations have

cooperated and supported one another on several occasions,

25 See James Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of
Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to
Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, I L :
Northwestern University Press, 1966), 63-71.
26 See Carmelo Mesa-Lago, Cuba in the 1970s
(Albuquerque, NM: University of New Mexico Press, 1974) for
a detailed explanation of the theory.
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there have also been many incidents when Cuban and Soviet
objectives and ideologies were in direct conflict,
especially concerning support for armed communist struggle
in the Third World.

Most recently, Castro has vocally

opposed Gorbachev's call for economic reforms and Soviet
reevaluation of foreign policy objectives.
This paper divides the evolution of Cuban-Soviet
relations into five distinct eras.

Chapter one examines

relations from Castro's victory in 1959 to Khrushchev's fall
from power in 1964.

During this period both nations worked

to establish positive economic and diplomatic relations and
to define particular goals.

Chapter two explores the

breakdown of Cuban-Soviet relations from 1964 to 1968.
During this period the Soviet Union sought improved
relations with the United States and moved away from direct
support for armed struggle in the Third World.

Castro,

however, desired a stronger communist presence in Third
World activities and criticized the Soviet Union for its
acquiescence and lack of interest in Third World affairs.
Chapter three examines renewed accommodation in Cuban-Soviet
relations beginning with Castro's support of the Soviet
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and continued improvement
through the middle of the 1970s.

This period was marked by

renewed foreign policy agreement between the two nations and
a build-up of Soviet military installations on Cuba.
Chapter four reviews Cuban-Soviet relations from 1975 to

18
1985.

During this period, Cuban and Soviet foreign policy

converged and resulted in active support for national
liberation movements in Africa and Latin America.

It was

during these years that Castro's role in determining CubanSoviet cooperation was most evident.

Chapter five examines

the dramatic changes in Cuban-Soviet relations which have
taken place during the first five years of Mikhail
Gorbachev's rule in the Soviet Union.

The sweeping reforms

that Gorbachev has proposed for Soviet economic and foreign
policies threaten to destroy the Cuban-Soviet rapprochement
that was built over the past two and a half decades.

The

chapter will examine changes in Soviet strategy, Castro's
reaction to these changes, and possible directions for the
future of Cuban-Soviet relations.

Chapter One
The Formation of Cuban-Soviet Ties: 1959-1964

Following World War II, the Soviets were eager to
encourage communist revolutions and establish influential
footholds in many regions of the Third World, particularly
in Asia and the Middle East.

The political elite during

Nikita Khrushchevvs regime sought to couple the technical,
economic, and military strength of the Soviet Union with the
desire of many African and Asian states to become
independent nations.

Khrushchev appeared convinced that

these nations would eagerly adopt Soviet-style communism in
exchange for Soviet aid and military assistance, thereby
spreading communist doctrine and expanding Soviet
influence.27

Latin America, however, was generally

disregarded by Khrushchev as a potential site for communist
revolution since most regimes in the region were either
democratic, supported by right-wing military officers, or
securely under the influence of the United States.

Even

Cuba during the revolution was seen as firmly controlled by
American interests and ties.
It was clear that the United States had no strong
/

27

W. R. Duncan, 27.
19

20
desire to see Castro*s revolutionary movement, known as "the
26th of July Movement,” secure power from Fulgencio Batista.
Through a memorandum issued by United States Ambassador Earl
Smith shortly before the Cuban elections of 1958, the United
States made clear its position regarding the revolution.
Smith wrote:

"Our [U.S.] interests and those of Cuba will

best be served by the continuation in office of the present
[Batista] government,

... by the holding of free, open, and

honest elections, and by the emergence of an administration
that would have the support of a majority of the people and
be able to maintain law and order, and fulfill Cuba's
international obligations."28

Although Castro denied that

the communists had any significant influence within his
movement, the United States continued to denounce Castro's
revolution as anti-democratic and made regular arms shipment
to Batista's forces to continue their fight against Castro.
American support for Batista reflected the United States'
concern that American interests in Cuba would be less secure
under Castro.
When Castro took control of the government in January
1959, neither the Soviet Union nor the United States was
eager to initiate warm ties with his revolutionary
government.

The Soviet Union had no reason to expect that

28 Alan H. Luxenberg, "Did Eisenhower Push Castro into
the Arms of the Soviets?," in Irving Louis Horowitz, ed.,
Cuban Communism (New Brunswick, N J : Transaction Publishers,
1989), 30.

21
Castro would declare himself and his government communist.
As Castro and his followers began their fight against
Batista, they were quick to align themselves with the pro
democracy capitalists who also sought an end to Batista's
rule.

As that support base began to falter, Castro was

equally willing to seek the support of the People's
Socialist Party (PSP), as the Cuban Communist Party was then
known.

However, the PSP was distrustful of Castro's sudden

goodwill and was reluctant to embrace the regime too
eagerly.

Similarly, the Soviet Union was opposed to

immediate diplomatic ties with Castro's government since
such ties could imperil Soviet-American relations.29

In

fact, the Soviet Union did not grant Castro's Cuba formal
diplomatic recognition until June 1960, over one year after
Castro instituted his revolutionary government.30
Poor relations between Cuba and the United States began
when Castro initiated a war of words with the United States
almost immediately after he took control of the island.

In

March 1959 Castro agreed to visit the United States at the
invitation of the American Association of Newspaper
Publishers.

Following an address to the organization in

Washington, DC, Castro was asked about the future direction
of Cuban foreign policy.

Avoiding a precise statement, he

29 Cole Blasier, The Giant's Rival: The USSR and Latin
America (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1987),
103.
30

J. I. Dominguez, 22.

22
stressed that he was not concerned about aggression that
might come from "other continents,** but about attacks by
"mercenary bands" that could come from the beaches of
Florida or from Santo Domingo.31
Castro*s preoccupation with the island's security and
fears of intervention from the United States were
legitimately founded.

In December 182 3 James Monroe warned

European powers that the United States "should consider any
attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion
of this [Western] Hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and
safety."32

The Monroe Doctrine served as the basis for

U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America until 1947 when all
American nations, including the United States, signed the
Rio Treaty which called for "immediate consultation" in the
event of an aggression against any American state.33
However, since 1898 when the United States secured Cuba's
independence from Spain as a result of the Spanish American
War, the island has occupied a unique position in U.S.
foreign policy.

Under the Platt Amendment, a series of

clauses incorporated into the Cuban Constitution of 1902,
the United States retained the legal right to intervene, at
its discretion, in Cuba's internal affairs.

Before the

31 Andres Suarez, Cuba; Castroism and Communism. 19591966 (Cambridge, MA: The M.I.T. Press, 1967), 47.
32 "Is Castro's Cuba A Soviet Base?," U.S. News and
World Report (September 10, 1962), 44.
33

Ibid.

23
amendment was repealed in 1934, the United States deemed it
necessary to intervene on several occasions.

The United

States occupied Cuba from 1906 to 1909, landed troops in
1917, and took temporary control of the nation's economy in
1933.34
Castro's fear of intervention by the United States
induced him to seek discreetly protection and assistance
from anti-American nations, particularly communist nations.
As a result, he sought stronger ties with the Soviet Union,
the only communist nation that could provide both military
protection for the island and economic assistance to ensure
the continued social and economic progress of the
revolution.

He realized that any significant alliance

between Cuba and the Soviet Union must be founded upon
ideology, as well as reciprocal economic and strategic
advantages.

Castro, however, had no strong ties to the

communists in Cuba.

During most of the revolution, the PSP

condemned the 26th of July Movement, including the
movement's first major act, an attack against the Moncada
Army Barracks in July 1953, which the communists viewed as
"putschist" and "bourgeois" in nature.35

Although the PSP

was outlawed in 1953 by Batista, it opposed any violent acts
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designed to bring about the collapse of the Batista
regime.36

The PSP sought to effect democratic reforms

employing non-violent, legal, and semi-legal tactics.
Although Castro was not a devout communist, his two
most important lieutenants in the movement, his brother Raul
, Castro and Ernesto "Che" Guevara, had well-established ties
to communist groups.

Prior to the revolution Raul Castro

had attended communist youth festivals, rallies, and
meetings in Cuba and Eastern Europe.

During a trip to

Eastern Europe in 1953 it is believed that he visited the
Soviet Union and established contacts with Soviet agents
before returning to Cuba.37

Che Guevara, a leftist

revolutionary from Argentina, met Raul Castro in Mexico and
agreed to return to Cuba with the expedition to overthrow
Batista.

Raul Castro was named Minister of the Armed Forces

and Guevara was named president of the Central Bank and
Minister of Industries.38

Later, both men would prove

essential in lending legitimacy to Castro's declaration that
his revolution was socialist in nature.
36 It is interesting to note that the Communist party
in Cuba enjoyed its greatest influence under Batista in the
late 1930s.
Batista, hoping to legitimize his dictatorship
through national elections, encouraged the Communists (then
the Revolutionary Union Party) to mobilize the masses behind
his regime.
Batista later outlawed the PSP to win favor
with the Eisenhower administration.
37 Rafael Fermoselle, Cuban Leadership After Castro:
Biographies of Cuba's Too Generals (Miami: Ediciones
Universal, 1987), 33.
38
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Although Castro did not declare his conversion to
Marxism-Leninism until December 1961, he immediately sought
two commitments from the Soviets: first, military protection
from the United States and its allies throughout Latin
America, and second, direct economic assistance to begin the
dismantling of Cuba's economic dependence on the United
States and American businesses on the island.

Although the

Soviet Union was apprehensive about undermining American
economic and political interests in Cuba, it seized upon
Cuban initiatives to develop bilateral trade agreements.
The first Cuban-Soviet economic agreement was signed in
April 1959.

Although its terms were hardly advantageous to

the Cuban economy, Castro recognized the importance of
formalizing trade with the Soviet Union in the hope that
Cuban-Soviet trade would lead eventually to Soviet
diplomatic recognition of Castro's revolutionary government.
The United States saw no significant threat posed by the
agreement since the terms were considerably less favorable
to Castro's Cuba than earlier Soviet agreements had been to
Batista's Cuba.

For example, it called for the Soviet Union

to purchase 170,000 tons of Cuban sugar (Cuba's chief
export), considerably less than it had purchased the
previous year from the Batista government.

Moscow would be

required to purchase an additional 330,000 tons, but only if
payments could be made in Soviet merchandise rather than
currency.

When Castro refused to accept Soviet merchandise
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in place of desperately needed currency, the Soviet Union
agreed to purchase the additional sugar outright.39
In a further attempt to improve relations with the
Soviet Union, Castro invited a high level delegation of
Soviet officials to visit Cuba in February 1960.

The Soviet

delegation, headed by Vice Premier Anastas Mikoyan, was met
with full honors.

During the visit Castro took every

opportunity to praise the political and economic
accomplishments of the Soviet Union.40

Many high-level

discussions took place regarding Cuban-Soviet relations.
These discussions resulted in the signing of the first
commercial agreement between Castro's government and the
Soviet Union.

The Soviets committed themselves to purchase

425,000 tons of sugar in 1960 and extended $100 million in
credit to Cuba for the purchase of industrial equipment.41
Yet although Castro was pleased with this strengthening of
Cuban-Soviet economic ties, he sought an expression of
Soviet support before finalizing plans to dismantle all
American economic interests in Cuba.
In 1960, Soviet foreign policy did not emphasize
increased political activities in Latin America, beyond

39 Jacques Levesque, The USSR and the Cuban Revolution
(New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1978), 13.
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41
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continuing to pursue stronger relations with Cuba.

Except

for a few pro-Soviet communist parties, the Soviet Union had
little encouragement for greater involvement in the region.
The only three armed revolts by pro-Soviet communists were
defeated and, until the Cuban revolution, Latin America
seemed securely guarded within the American sphere of
influence.42

Although Khrushchev did not wish to

antagonize U.S.-Soviet relations by overtly accepting Cuba
into the Soviet camp, he recognized the potential benefits
from establishing stronger ties with Cuba, particularly
using Cuba as a base for anti-American rhetoric in the
region, as a camp for fostering communist activities in the
region, and as a liaison between the Soviet Union and the
Third World.43
On February 12, 1960, Khrushchev for the first time
publicly stated his support for the Castro government in a
speech before the Indian Parliament in New Delhi.
Khrushchev, expressing satisfaction with Latin American
people's struggle for independence said, "Our sympathies
have always been and will always be with countries like Cuba
who defend their national and economic independence through
arduous struggle.... The Soviet Union has always given and
will continue to give disinterested aid and support to all
42 The three armed revolts by pro-Soviet
revolutionaries include: El Salvador in 1932, Brazil in
1935, and Guatemala in 1944.
43
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countries in their struggle for freedom and independence, in
their struggle against economic backwardness."44
Following this sign of overt Soviet support for Cuba's
break with American economic oppression, Castro initiated a
battle with American businesses in Cuba.

On June 29 and 30,

1960, Cuban authorities seized oil refineries owned and
operated by Texaco, Esso, and the Shell Oil Company
following their refusal to process crude oil purchased from
the Soviet Union.45

Castro then authorized the

expropriation of all property in Cuba owned by United States
citizens and businesses.

The United States responded by

cutting U.S. purchases of Cuban sugar by 95 percent for the
remainder of I960.46

The Soviet Union later agreed to

purchase all sugar earmarked for sale to the United States.
This incident served to usher in an era of Cuban-American
hostilities that would contribute to the solidification of
Cuban-Soviet ties.
President Eisenhower began planning covert and
diplomatic maneuvers against Castro's government.

In late

1960 Cuban intelligence learned that the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (C.I.A.) was training Cuban exiles to
invade Cuba and overthrow Castro.

By 1961 the United States
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had imposed an economic, commercial, and financial blockade
against Cuba, and initiated procedures which would exclude
Cuba from membership in the Organization of American States
(O.A.S.).47

In February 1961, the Cuban government

uncovered a C.I.A. plot to assassinate Castro.

And on April

17, U.S.-backed Cuban exiles landed at the Bay of Pigs to
initiate an unsuccessful coup d'etat.

With Cuban-American

relations officially severed and Castro's suspicions of
American hostility justified, Castro sought to implant Cuba
firmly inside the Soviet military camp.

He realized that

the open acceptance of Marxism-Leninism would encourage and
justify full-fledged Soviet military protection for Cuba.
Castro's "conversion" to communism was a careful and
deliberate plan intended to secure the Soviet Union's
acceptance of Castro and his revolution.

Castro began by

encouraging stronger ties between the revolutionary
government and the PSP.

This proved easy since the post

revolutionary communists were eager to form an alliance with
the Castro government in order to insure survival of the
party.

Raul Castro and Guevara, whose ties to communist

ideology were long established, became active in the
leadership of the PSP.4,8 Finally, on April 2, 1961, Castro
publicly proclaimed the socialist character of the Cuban
revolution.

Following Castro's remarks a key advisor
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explained that the revolution had completed the stage of
national liberation and Cuba had definitely embarked upon
the construction of a socialist state.49

By mid-1961

Pravda and other Soviet publications had begun referring to
Cuba as a Marxist-Leninist state.
In July 1961, Castro created the Integrated
Revolutionary Organization which united into one body the
26th of July Movement, the PSP, and the Revolutionary
Directorate, a student group active in the movement against
the Batista government.

Castro then created a new communist

party, the United Party of the Socialist Revolution and
defended its creation in a five hour speech to the nation on
December 1, 1961.

It was during this speech that he

celebrated his “conversion to Marxism-Leninism."50
Castro's plans seemed to work as intended.

The Soviet

leaders resolved that the conceivable benefits gained from a
constructive alliance with Cuba, particularly a potentially
stronger and influential presence in Latin America and the
Third World, outweighed the negative effects the alliance
would have on Soviet relations with the United States.

As

the Soviet Union began to recognize Castro's commitment to
communism, arms shipments to the island were increased.

The

Soviet Union bolstered Cuba's physical security by providing
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most of the equipment for the island's armed forces, an
amount estimated at $933 million between 1961 and 1975.51
Khrushchev clearly wanted to take advantage of the strategic
importance of Cuba as a bridge to establishing stronger
political and economic ties with other Latin American
nations.

The Soviet government began to declare its

confidence in the possibility of other successful communistled national liberation movements in the Western Hemisphere.
A major Soviet foreign policy paper, published by the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1961,
declared:
The triumph of the revolution in Cuba dispelled
the myth of the omnipotent power of American
imperialism in Latin America.

It showed that the

United States of America in the present
international situation cannot undertake armed
intervention in the countries of Latin America
with her former ease....

The Cuban

Revolution...became the model of national
liberation movements in the Western Hemisphere.52
Although both sides were comfortable with the
relationship which had developed between Cuba and the Soviet
51
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Union, the military aspect of the relationship quickly and
unexpectedly assumed greater significance.

In 1962,

Khrushchev decided to deploy nuclear missiles on Cuba in
response to a U.S. statement that disclosed an American
advantage over the Soviets in tactical and strategic nuclear
weapons.53

Khrushchev’s decision was precipitated by

attacks by leading members of the CPSU who questioned
Khrushchev's ability to maintain Soviet parity with the
United States and called on Khrushchev to prove his
leadership.

In response to the American boast and

dissension within the party, Khrushchev decided to take
advantage of his new relationship with Castro.

The

deployment of nuclear missiles on the island would help to
equalize Soviet deficiencies in the balance of nuclear
strategic weapons.

Khrushchev, however, sought to have

Castro initiate the missile agreement and sent a special
envoy to convince Castro of an imminent threat of another
invasion by the United States.54

Castro was convinced and

decided that the only way to defend against American
aggression was to accept deployment of Soviet missiles.
Khrushchev received approval for nuclear arms shipments
to Cuba in April 1962 and the mission was begun by late
July.

In August, thirty-seven Soviet dry-cargo ships

arrived at Cuban ports, at least twenty of them carrying
53
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arms shipments.

By the end of the month the Soviets had

sent surface-to-air missiles, cruise missiles, guided
missile boats, and tons of support materials.

The first

medium-range ballistic missiles arrived on September 8,
hidden in the hold of a Soviet lumber ship.

Delivery

systems, including Soviet bombers and fighter jets,
followed.

By the end of September the island was a

functional, tightly guarded nuclear installation.

The bases

were under complete Soviet control and even Castro's most
trusted military officers were denied access to the
bases.55

In September 1962 Castro seemed assured of the

Soviets' commitment to Cuba and the protection of the
island.
Yet the weakness of Soviet dedication to the military
defense of Cuba was revealed in October 1962 following the
Cuban Missile Crisis.

On October 14, President John Kennedy

was presented with proof of a Soviet nuclear arms build-up
on Cuba.

A direct confrontation between the United States

and t h e S o v i e t Union began when the United States presented
its proof before the United Nations and demanded that
further nuclear arms shipments to Cuba be halted and current
nuclear arms be removed from the island.
Kennedy imposed a naval blockade of Cuba.

On October 22,
The following

day, in an attempt to create a pacific settlement of the
crisis, Castro told the United States that the Soviet
55

Ibid., 34-35.

34
military hardware would not be necessary if the United
States would give Cuba "effective and satisfactory
guarantees with respect to [Cuba's] territorial integrity
and ... cease in its subversive and counterrevolutionary
activities against [the Cuban] people."56

On October 28,

Khrushchev agreed to dismantle offensive armaments under
United Nations supervision.
Castro was dissatisfied with the resolution since the
United States was not made to publicly agree to respect the
sovereignty of Castro*s communist government and the
territorial integrity of Cuba.

The missile crisis clearly

proved to Castro that the Soviet Union was more committed to
avoiding nuclear confrontation with the United States than
it was to encouraging the growth of communism in Cuba and
other Latin American nations.

This revelation encouraged

Castro’s eventual break from Soviet-style communism and
adoption of a Marxist system more suited to his control over
Cuba.
Despite the crisis' disclosure of the true political
relationship between the Soviet Union and Cuba, Castro had
sound economic reasons for sustaining ties with the Soviet
Union.

In 1961 and 1962 the Soviet Union had provided Cuba

with subsidized oil and purchased nearly half the sugar the
island produced at inflated prices.

The Soviet Union and

Eastern Europe also provided Cuba with substantial economic
56
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However, even this relationship was strained when

the Soviets called-for economic reforms in Chiba.

In May

1962, Khrushchev addressed a group of Cuban students
returning to their homeland and warned them that Soviet aid
alone would not be sufficient to cure Cuba's economic
ills.58

Khrushchev began signalling that the Soviet Union

was not willing to subsidize Cuba's faltering economy unless
significant reforms were initiated.

The Soviet Union was

most concerned about Castro's plans to initiate a plan of
radical industrialization which overestimated Cuba's access
to raw materials, technology, and other imports.

Khrushchev

feared that Castro's industrial ambitions reflected an
overly optimistic view of the Soviet Union's ability and
desire to foster and sustain a strong, albeit inefficient,
industrial basis for the Cuban economy.

Castro, however,

was not willing to accept Soviet intrusion into Cuba's
domestic affairs so soon after having defended itself from
American encroachment.

Surprisingly, the two nations signed

a trade agreement in late 1962 which was quite favorable to
the Cubans.

The Soviets nonetheless showed their

dissatisfaction with Castro's policies by delaying shipment
of food to the island.
Despite the loss of Cuba as a strategic nuclear
military base, the Soviets continued to see the island as
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their most effective sounding board for pro-communist
rhetoric to Latin America.

However, Castro's move away from

Soviet political dominance later caused clear discords in
Soviet and Cuban approaches to communist advancement in
Latin America.

Castro pretentiously insisted on the role of

armed struggle as a vehicle to change in Latin America and
called for Soviet military assistance to insurgent groups
throughout the region.

This issue would seal the coffin on

Cuban-Soviet relations until a temporary compromise on the
issue could be reached following the fall of Khrushchev as
leader of the CPSU in Qc^ob1
e.r._i964.
During the first six years of years of Soviet-Cuban
relations, both nations began to establish objectives that
would continue to determine the state of the relationship.
However, it was clearly Castro who attracted Soviet interest
in Cuba and the Soviets who served Cuban interests.

Because

of his clearly defined goals, Castro was able to direct the
formation of Cuban-Soviet ties.

His most important

objective was national security and protection against the
reassertion of American domination.

This objective was met

to Castro's satisfaction with the installation of Soviet
arms on the island, a project that continued until the
missile crisis of 1962.

Castro's second objective was

economic assistance to improve the standard of living on the
island and ensure the success of the revolution.

The Soviet

Union helped secure this objective by providing Cuba with
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considerable economic assistance.

In return, Khrushchev,

whose objectives were less clearly developed, expected Cuban
allegiance to Soviet-style communism and, possibly, greater
influence in Latin America and the Third World.

The Soviet

Union also hoped to arm Cuba and use the island as its
Caribbean fortress.

But, when this objective directly

clashed with Khrushchev*s desire to maintain peaceful
coexistence with the United States, the Soviet relations
with the United States proved more critical.

Although the

ties developed quickly, the conditions for the alliance
remained poorly defined and the first major test to the
alliance, the Cuban Missile Crisis, threatened to overshadow
the benefits each nation derived from the relationship.

Chapter Two
The Destabilization of Cuban-Soviet Relations: 1964-1968

Although Castro withstood pressures to become the
passive Soviet ally that Khrushchev may have desired when
the relationship began in 1961, the relationship never
endangered Soviet relations with other communist nations.
However, when Khrushchev fell from power in 1964, he was
succeeded by a more cautious leadership which sought to move
more slowly in developing relationships in the Third World,
especially with Cuba. As he became aware of Moscow's more
cautious approach to Cuban-Soviet ties,-Castro's criticism
of Soviet foreign policy became more vocal and more
frequent.59

Castro and the new Soviet leadership differed

on several important policy priorities, including the role
of armed struggle to promote communism in the Third World
and the level of Soviet support of communist rebels in
Vietnam.
The issue of armed struggle proved to be one of the
most divisive issues affecting Cuban-Soviet relations.
Castro first made clear his support for revolutionary
violence in Latin America following a meeting of the foreign
59
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ministers of O.A.S. member states in January 1962.

At the

meeting the member states, most of whom already had severed
diplomatic ties with Castro's Cuba, passed resolutions that
displayed antagonism toward Castro's revolution and the
growth of communism in Latin America.

Among them were

resolutions stating that "the principles of communism are
incompatible with the principles of the inter-American
system,” and that the "present government of Cuba, which has
officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist
government, is incompatible with the inter-American system"
and was thereby suspended from participation in it.60
Other resolutions excluded Cuba from inter-American defense
trade and alliances, including the Organization of American
States.
Castro's response came shortly after the conclusion of
the conference.

On February 5, 1962 he proclaimed the

Second Declaration of Havana, in which he urged the "colored
races" and peasants of the Americas to rise up in armed
struggle against their oppressors.61

Castro's principles

coincided with the beliefs of most Chinese communist leaders
who were encouraging armed struggle in Asia.
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the Soviets who were battling with China for leadership of
communist parties in thei Third.World.

Cuba was the Soviet

Union's most loyal ally in the Third World and the Soviets
did not enjoy seeing Castro espouse the tenets of the
Chinese Communist Party.
Castro's first implementation of the idea of armed
struggle was revealed by the Venezuelan government in the
fall of 1963 when a shipment of arms to Venezuelan
guerrillas was discovered.

The arms were traced back to

Cuba and Cuba was charged by Venezuela and other O.A.S.
member states with an aggression against Venezuela and an
intervention into its internal affairs.

Castro claimed his

actions were fair retaliation against Venezuela for having
led the move to exclude Cuba from all inter-American
activities.

Castro argued that "the people of Cuba consider

themselves to have an equal right to help, with the
resources that are available to them, the revolutionary
movements in all countries that engage in such intervention
in the internal affairs of our country."62

All Latin

American governments, except Mexico, had agreed to the
resolutions which served to isolate Cuba, and thus all were
potential targets of Castro's reprisal.
By the end of 1964, the new Soviet leadership attempted
to come to an agreement with Castro on the issue of armed

62 Obra revolucionaria. no. 18 (1964), as quoted in J.
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struggle.

To emphasize its dedication to Third World

communist parties, the Soviet Union organized a conference
of Latin American communist parties which was held in
December in Havana.

It was clear that the communist parties

of Latin America were themselves divided over which route
would be the most effective to bring about political change.
Some agreed that revolution was the most effective means to
wrest power from the bourgeoisie while others maintained
that ^communist parties must make all attempts to bring about
change without resorting to armed struggle.
Recognizing the divisions among the regional communist
parties, the Soviets and Cubans came to an agreement.

The

Soviets agreed to support armed struggle in six Latin
American nations where communist-led revolutionary activity
was already occurring, namely Venezuela, Colombia,
Guatemala, Honduras, Paraguay, and Haiti.

However, the

Cubans conceded to recognize unarmed struggle as the
legitimate course for pro-Soviet communist parties to follow
in other Latin American nations.63

As a result of the

conference, the Soviets believed that they had quelled a
major rift that threatened to separate Cuba and other Latin
American communist parties from the Soviet camp, but the
rift had only temporarily been bridged.
By 1965 the weakness of Latin American communist
parties' commitment to armed struggle was exposed.
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communist party in Venezuela, the most committed to armed
struggle, began to reassess the effectiveness of its
guerrilla faction and decided to seek legal or semi-legal
means to attain a communist presence in the government.
Similar developments elsewhere led Castro and other Cuban
communist leaders to abandon the 1964 agreement and denounce
non-violent communist parties for their ineffectiveness,
/ ■

bureaucracy, and lack of commitment to the communist
cause.64
Castro decided to support armed struggle in the Third
World wholeheartedly, despite any negative effects on CubanSoviet relations.

In January 1966 Castro organized the

Tricontinental Conference of African, Asian, and Latin
American communist parties.

At the conference, Castro was

candid regarding his policy disputes with the Soviets.

He

again raised the issue of armed struggle, hoping to find
sympathetic supporters among the Chinese and other Asian
representatives, particularly the North Koreans and the
North Vietnamese.

The Soviet representatives looked on with

astonishment as Castro closed the conference with a blatant
condemnation of the Soviets' position on armed struggle:
...sooner or later all or almost all peoples will
have to take up arms to liberate themselves....
What with the ones who theorize and the ones who
criticize those who theorize while beginning to
64
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theorize themselves, much energy and time is
unfortunately lost? we believe that on this
continent, in the case of all or almost all
peoples, the battle will take on the most violent
forms.65
These words signalled to the Soviet representatives and the
representatives of other communist nations that Cuba was
intent upon causing a major breach in Cuban-Soviet
relations.
One example of the issues that led to open clashes
between the Soviet Union and Cuba involved the degree of
Soviet support for communist Viet Cong guerrillas.
Beginning in 1965 Castro stepped up his indictments against
Moscow's handling of the conflict in Vietnam.66

Throughout

1965 the United States had steadily increased its bomb
attacks against communist guerrillas in North Vietnam.
Castro felt that the Soviets were neglecting their
"socialist brethren" and called for increased aid to the
guerrillas to promote retaliation against American forces.
A Cuban delegate addressing the Twenty-Third Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1966 stated
that, in combatting U.S. backed imperialism, it is necessary
to "use all available means...and take all necessary risks."
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The delegate's remarks received no applause.67
The Cuban government's message was clear and the ball
was plainly in the Soviets' court.

Communist parties

throughout the world, including those in other Latin
American nations, began to call for official sanctions
against Castro's Cuba.

However, the Soviets, fearful of

isolating Cuba and leaving it susceptible to
counterrevolution, resisted.58

To cut off military and

economic assistance to Cuba would entail leaving Cuba
vulnerable to intervention by the United States or
diplomatic action by the O.A.S. that would lead to the
overthrow of Castro.

And since there was no other strong

communist representative in Latin America, this would leave
the Soviets without an ally in the region.
the Soviets did not want to alienate Castro.

For this reason,
The Soviets

realized that Cuba was unlikely to break with them so long
as it needed Soviet military and economic assistance.

And

although the Soviets were investing considerable resources
in their relationship with Cuba, the island remained a
beneficial and necessary ally.
Although Moscow did not want to cut off Cuba from
Soviet financial assistance, it did seek some form of
retaliation against Cuba's criticism.

When Arab nations

called for an oil embargo in 1967, the Soviets took
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advantage of the potential impact its oil exportation
policies could have on foreign relations.

The Soviets^

ignored Cuban requests for a ten percent increase in Soviet
oil imports, respondingwith only a two percent increase in
1 9 6 7 ^ -The Soviet Union sold the remaining oil on the
open market to earn much-needed hard currency to finance its
own internal economic expansion.

There is little doubt that

both sides recognized that such economic sanctions were one
of the most powerful weapons available to the Soviets for
applying pressure on the unrepentant Cuban regime.

Castro

was aware of the economic importance of Soviet oil shipments
to Cuban industry.

The Soviets also suspended military

shipments to Cuba in 1968, cut Cuban enrollment in Soviet
universities, limited technical assistance to Cuba, and
delayed trade agreements with Cuba in 1968.70
The worsening of Cuban-Soviet relations in this period
was due primarily to Castro1s desire to prove himself as the
predominant communist leader in Latin America and the
uncontested representative of Third World interests to the
Soviet Union.

He worked vigorously to preserve Cuba's

elevated, and arguably undeserving, status in the eyes of
the Soviet Union.

Similarly, he did not want to give the

impression of becoming a puppet whose actions were directed
by the Soviet Union.

He took every opportunity to disclose
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where his and the Soviet leadership's views differed.

His

willingness to openly and forcefully confront Soviet leaders
on an issue as delicate as armed struggle signalled to the
Soviets his perception that Cuba's position within the
relationship was secure.

Soviet leaders agreed that

Castro's position was secure and wanted to ensure his
continued alliance to the Soviet Union.
Castro recognized the importance of Soviet military and
economic assistance to his island's security and prosperity,
but his dedication to Cuban communism and Cuba's agenda in
Latin America and the Third World encouraged him to resist
political submission to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets were

aware of the friction Cuba was causing within and outside
the Soviet camp of communist parties, but did not want to
risk pushing Castro toward developing relations with China
or the United States.

Both sides realized that, if the

relationship was to continue, common ground must be
discovered and the policy aims of both nations must be taken
into account.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968

and Castro's acclaim for the action provided that common
ground, which would lead to renewed accommodation in CubanSoviet relations.

Chapter Three
Renewed Accommodation in Cuban-Soviet Relations: 1968-1975

By the end of 1967, Castro was facing the greatest
challenges to his government since the end of the
revolution.

Ernesto "Che” Guevara, one of his greatest

advisors and a major hero of the 26th of July Movement, had
been killed in Bolivia on October 8 after having been
ostracized by the Bolivian communist revolutionaries he was
trying to lead.

The death of Guevara symbolized the

deteriorating support for armed struggle among Latin
American revolutionaries.

Many of the communist parties

that had earlier supported Castro's call for violent methods
began to accept the Soviet line of non-violent revolution.
The growing allegiance to Soviet-style communism reflected
Castro's failing influence in the region.71
Castro's loss of credibility among Third World
revolutionaries stemmed, in part, from Cuba's worsening
economy.

Despite continued Soviet assistance, though at

lower levels than Castro had demanded, the economy began to
collapse.

Cuba's economy began to reflect badly on the

71 Christopher Whalen, "The Soviet Military Buildup in
Cuba," in I. L. Horowitz, 625-626.
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government as trade deficits with the Soviet Union
increased, goods grew scarce, and rationing became part of
the status quo.72

To other pro-communist regimes in the

Third World, the Cuban model of revolution and development
was no longer attractive.
Brezhnev too was facing mounting problems of his own.
The threat posed by Cuban criticism of Soviet policies was
worsened by dissension within the Warsaw Pact and continued
difficulties with China.

The gravest threat to Soviet

leadership of the socialist world came from Czechoslovakia.
In 1968, conservative Stalinists were driven from power and
replaced by reform-minded communists headed by Alexander
Dubcek who called for greater independence from Soviet
control.

Brezhnev decided to reaffirm Soviet control over

its satellites, particularly Czechoslovakia.

In May 1968

the Soviet military began conducting maneuvers on Czech
soil.

On August 21, Soviet tanks invaded Prague and forced

the ouster of Dubcek's government.

Castro, recognizing the

benefits of improved Cuban-Soviet-relations, took notice of
the severity of Soviet actions and began to reassess his
firm stand against Soviet influence in Cuban affairs.73
Although Castro did not fully support the invasion of
Czechoslovakia, he realized that Cuba's economic and
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security concerns outweighed his aversion to the invasion.
The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia is generally
recognized as one of the most significant junctures in
Cuban-Soviet relations.

It marked the transition from a

period of extreme disharmony to one of renewed
accommodation.

However, the transition was not an easy one

considering Castro's ideology and his commitment to Cuban
nationalism.

The act was clearly a violation of

Czechoslovakian sovereignty.

Castro knew the proposed

reforms by Dubcek represented a move away from Soviet
domination and expressed growing Czech nationalism.

The day

after the invasion there was a large demonstration in Havana
protesting the invasion.

However, Castro realized that his

condemnation of the action could serve only to add to the
strains on Cuban-Soviet relations.
On August 23, following two days of silence regarding
the Soviet invasion, Castro defended Soviet actions and
publicly embraced the "Brezhnev Doctrine," a resolution
affirming that the Soviet Union retained the right to invade
any Eastern European nation that threatened to leave the
socialist camp.

Knowing that his position could prove

unpopular, Castro began his speech to the Cuban people
saying, "some of the things we are going to say here will be
in contradiction with the emotions of many."

He defended

his position by arguing that the Czech leadership had been
"in camaraderie with pro-Yankee spies" and with the agents
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of West Germany and all that fascist and reactionary
rabble.'*74

The Soviets were pleased with Castro's support

for Soviet policy and initiated a period of political,
economic, and military rapprochement with Cuba.
Following more than a decade of neglect of most of its
critical industries, Castro assented to direct Soviet
involvement in Cuba's economy.

Throughout the 1960s, Castro

had devoted most of the nation's resources to ensuring the
social success of his revolution.

He poured money into

public services, including health care and education, so
that the population could experience the tangible benefits
of revolution.

Although Soviet aid and technology made it

possible to sustain certain key industries, especially the
production of sugar and nickel, most of the nation's
industries and production facilities were run-down and in
desperate need of modernization.
The Soviets frequently offered to take a more active *
role in the Cuban economy and urged Castro to adopt a system
of central economic planning similar to the Soviet model. *
However, Castro opposed central planning since he thought it
was too rigid for the rapidly changing Cuban economy.

But

as the economy deteriorated and Castro realized his economic
strategy was jeopardizing the success of the revolution, he
began to consider greater compliance with the Soviet model
and integration into the Soviet bloc.
74
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defector from Cuba's intelligence network revealed that
Castro had signed an accord with Moscow committing himself
to a pro-Moscow course, in return for which Moscow agreed to
continue economic assistance to Cuba and supply 5,000
technicians to restructure the island's faltering
economy.75
The Soviet technicians reorganized the Cuban government
and bureaucracies to parallel the systems found in the
Soviet Union and other Eastern European nations.

The

technicians sought first to legitimize the role of the Cuban
Communist Party (PCC) as an active body within the Cuban
government.

The political system was reorganized along

Leninist lines with Castro as head of government and the PCC
as the primary governing body, albeit a tool to enhance
Castro's control over the island.

The next key step was the

creation of the Inter-Governmental Cuban-Soviet Commission
for Economic, Scientific, and Technological Cooperation, a
venture begun in 1970 which legitimized and facilitated
Soviet-sponsored economic and political reforms in Cuba.76
In 1975 the Cuban government announced the nation's first
five-year economic plan for 1976 through 1980.77

The plan

was designed and implemented by Soviet and Eastern European
75
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technicians.

The most important move came in July 1972 when

Cuba was admitted to the Soviet-directed Council for Mutual
Economic Assistance (CMEA).

This gave the Soviet Union and

±€s communist allies greater control over the reorganization
of the Cuban economy in a manner more closely resembling the
Soviet model.78
The period following Cuban admission into the CMEA was
marked by the paradox of integration between Cuba and its
communist allies in organizational matters and divergence
between them in balance of trade.

Cuba benefitted greatly

from access to CMEA markets, especially the ability to
import larger amounts of raw materials and manufactured
goods from East Germany and the Soviet Union.

Eastern

European nations failed to benefit significantly from the
limited agricultural goods, primarily sugar and tobacco,
exported from Cuba.

Although the Soviets did not want to

increase Cuban dependence on Soviet bloc trade, they sought
to maintain adequate dependence to ensure Cuba's continued
need of the Soviet bloc.79

The Soviets, appreciating their

increased influence over Cuban political and economic
matters, were careful not to make specific demands on
Castro.

Castro, who had come to power on his own and proven

himself a major figure in the international arena as a
result of his charisma, strong will, and political
78
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v shrewdness, was more valuable as a willing ally of the
Soviets than as a controlled puppet.

In Cuba he was a

popular leader whose control was not to be challenged.
Therefore, Soviet leaders were careful to include Castro in
decisions regarding Cuba's economy.

The Soviets also made

every attempt to meet Castro'srequests whenever they"were
not detrimental to Soviet aims and interests.80

For

example, Cuba was awarded economic favors at Castro's
request, including rescheduling of Cuba's trade debt with
the Soviet Union, heavily subsidized agriculture, and
modernization of industry.
For the Soviets, stronger economic ties with Cuba
helped to ensure Soviet influence in economic, political,
and foreign affairs.

By the mid-1970s, the Cuban economy

was so dependent on Soviet economic assistance that Castro
could not afford to turn away from the Soviet Union without
jeopardizing the island's economy.

Cuban membership in the

CMEA, through which most of the economic benefits were
acquired, demanded Castro's full political and economic
cooperation.

Cuba's membership also displayed the expanding

influence that the Soviet Union was enjoying throughout the
world.

By generously subsidizing the Cuban economy, the

Soviets hoped to use the island as an example of the Soviet
commitment to Marxist-Leninist regimes in the Third
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World.81
Besides serving Moscow as an international proxy, Cuba
remained important to the Soviet Union for strategic
reasons.

Following Cuban-Soviet rapprochement, the Soviets

sought to refortify Cuba as a military bastion.

In 1968 the

Soviet navy extended its forward deployment to include the
Arabian Sea, the Horn of Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the
Caribbean.82

To service the Soviet fleet in the Caribbean,

the Soviets acquired Cuban permission to construct a base at
Cienfuegos, Cuba.

In July 1969, as the Soviet Union was

preparing for the opening round of the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks (SALT I), a nine-ship Soviet navy task
force, including one nuclear submarine, visited Cuba and
conducted maneuvers in the Gulf of Mexico.83

This task

force marked the first time since the destruction of the
Spanish fleet off Santiago de Cuba in 1898 that the naval
force of a rival extrahemispheric power had been allowed to
enter the Caribbean without United States intervention.
United States chose to ignore the maneuvers.

The

Nixon,

perceiving no threat from the task force, did not want to
respond in any way that might have jeopardized negotiations
for a possible U.S.-Soviet SALT agreement.84
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In late 1969, the Soviet Union and Cuba arranged
several high-level meetings to discuss improved military
relations.

In November, Soviet Defense Minister Andrei

Grechko visited Cuba before attending the SALT I meetings
with the United States.

In April 1970, Cuban Armed Forces

Minister Raul Castro spent five weeks in the Soviet Union
and met personally with Brezhnev.85

In June 1970, the U.S.

National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, alerted
President Nixon to increased Soviet military activity in
Cuba.

He warned:
While the Soviet naval visits may be part of the
overall trend in recent years toward increased
Soviet naval activity ever further from Soviet
home ports, they may also be an effort to
'•accustom" Washington to greater Soviet use of
Cuba by establishing gradually the precedent of
visits and bunkering of active Soviet fleet and
air units.

The Soviets could conceivably wish to

maintain Soviet naval units in the Caribbean-South
Atlantic on a more or less permanent basis,
refueling and resupplying out of Cuba.86
United States intelligence personnel began to pay
considerable attention to the activities of the Soviet
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military in and around Cuba.
In September 1970, the United States collected evidence
of what appeared to be the construction of a permanent base
for Soviet nuclear submarines at Cienfuegos.

Since the

construction of the installation could afford the Soviets a
base for nuclear hardware and delivery systems, the incident
was compared to the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the issue
served as a test of the secret agreement which resulted from
the crisis prohibiting Soviet nuclear weapons in Cuba in
exchange for U.S. recognition of Cuban sovereignty.87

When

American congressional leaders called for action, the United
States and the Soviet Union arranged for quiet negotiations.
These negotiations yielded an agreement by which Moscow
agreed to stop servicing nuclear submarines in Cuban
ports.88
Although it appeared the Soviets once again had given
in to U.S. pressure, the Soviets decided to test the
agreement.

Brezhnev ordered Soviet nuclear submarines to

continue using the base at Cienfuegos for servicing and
naval exercises continued for over a year without any
response from the United States.

It is generally believed

that the United States was aware of the submarines and their
visits to Cienfuegos, but the Nixon administration ignored
the violations in order to ensure good relations between the
87
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United States and Soviet Union at the SALT I meetings in May
1971.89

Castro was pleased with the Soviet*s noncompliance

with the agreement.

By testing the U.S. response, the

Soviet Union had shown that Cuba was a vital part of Soviet
strategy.90

This assured Castro that the Soviets were

willing to arm and defend the island.
Soviet military activity in Cuba continued to increase
steadily throughout the 1970s and Castro remained an ardent
supporter of Soviet foreign policy.

There were many signs

of the strong relations between the two nations, including a
trip by Brezhnev to Cuba in January 1975, shortly after the
fifteenth anniversary^of the Cuban Revolution.

Although

Khrushchev had been invited to visit Cuba several times, he
feared that such a visit would have an adverse effect on
U.S.-Soviet relations.

And by the time Brezhnev had

consolidated power in the late 1960s, Cuba had stopped
issuing invitations to Soviet leaders.

Therefore, the trip

symbolized a significant improvement in Cuban-Soviet
relations.

During the trip, Castro publicly assailed the

United States and China for their recent attempts to
reconcile and form an anti-Soviet alliance.91

This was

seen by most observers as an open announcement of renewed
Cuban-Soviet friendship and a rejection of Chinese goodwill
89
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toward Cuba and other Third World nations.
In June 1975, an international conference of 24 Latin
American communist parties was held in Havana.

Castro used

the conference as an opportunity to proclaim publicly the
Cuban-Soviet rapprochement.

The conference served to

demonstrate the firm support the Latin American communist
parties afforded the Soviet Union and its policies toward
the United States, China, and the Third World.92

Castro

again expressed his contentment with improved relations with
the Soviet Union at the first congress of the Cuban
Communist Party in December 1975.

The congress itself was

important since it clearly displayed the newly prominent
position which the PCC occupied in the restructured Sovietstyle Cuban political system.93
Despite the lavish praise Castro directed toward
Moscow, the relationship was a two way street.

In return,

Castro received considerable support from the Soviet Union
when he sought to formalize ties with several African
nations and act as the spokesman for Soviet and communist
interests in Africa.94

A tour was organized for March and

April 1977 which afforded Castro the opportunity to promote
Cuba's foreign policy agenda and offer Cuban support for
revolutionary activity throughout the continent and took
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Castro to eight African nations before ending with an
official visit to Moscow.

The Soviets benefitted

tremendously as a result of this show of confidence in
Castro, since he reciprocated by allowing Cuban troops to
fight a proxy war in Africa on behalf of the Soviet Union.
This period in Cuban-Soviet relations represents a time
.
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of cordiality and mutual benefit.
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Although Castro was

forced to temper his enthusiasm for armed aggression and
stress compatible aspects of Soviet foreign policy, his
regime was awarded greater importance and legitimacy in the
international communist community.

Cuba's membership in the

CMEA, often viewed as a decision that severely restricted
Cuban autonomy, actually contributed to the security of the
regime and the benefits of the revolution so long as the
CMEA trade agreements remained favorable to Cuba.
Similarly, it further accredited Cuba as a representative of
i

communist interests in the Third World.

It was during this
i

period that Cuba proved itself an influential actor in
international politics and paved the route for Cuban-Soviet
cooperation in Africa and Latin America.

Chapter Four
Cuban-Soviet Foreign Policy Cooperation: 1975-1985

Cuba's foreign policy interests had always centered on
the promotion of its own security and prosperity.

However,

Castro also sought to establish for himself and his
government a position in the international community which
would allow Cuba to champion the causes of developing
nations generally, and Latin America specifically.

Castro

recognized that there existed a power vacuum in Latin
America which no nation, other than the United States, was
able to fill.

He aimed to assume the leadership of Latin

America and break U.S. control over the region and
recognized the Soviet Union's eagerness to see Castro, its
only socialist ally in the region, succeed.
Castro's objectives in Latin America and the Third
World were to redefine the relationship that existed between
developed and developing nations and secure for developing
nations access to the resources and technology of more
advanced nations.

Cuba and its beneficial relationship with

the Soviet Union served as proof that access to such
resources could promote the development of Third World
economies and societies.

Realizing that he must reach
60
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beyond Latin America to regions outside of U.S. domination,
Castro began to focus his attention on the less developed
nations of Asia and Africa.

Despite its close relationship

with the Soviet Union, Cuba became an active and influential
member of the Nonaligned Movement, a political association
of developing nations designed to focus international
attention on issues relevant to the Third World.

Although

Cuba saw membership in the Movement as a means to acquire
political leverage independent of the Soviet Union, the
Movement benefitted from Cuba's well-established clout, both
politically and economically, in the world community.95
The Soviets also welcomed Cuba's participation in the
Movement since Cuba's elevated status within, and eventual
leadership of, the Movement served to quietly promote
socialism among developing nations.

Both nations aspired to

increase their influence in the Third World.
By the mid-1970s the strong ties and similar objectives
between Cuba and the Soviet Union began to manifest
themselves in the form of foreign policy cooperation in the
Third World.

The early Cuban-Soviet relationship focused on

Cuba's effectiveness as a model for other pro-communist
movements in Latin America.

Cuba's ability to serve as a

viable model for African nations was not recognized until
the beginning of an African reaction against the
neocolonialism which characterized the post-independence
95
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period.

Although most European powers had withdrawn from

Africa, the borders, governments, and economic
infrastructure that remained revealed a continuing European
presence.

Recognizing that pan-African trade and alliances

were not remedying the region*s severe economic and social
problems, many African governments sought the assistance of
the United States and the Soviet Union.96

Africa, a region

that once placed very low in the foreign policy priorities
of the superpowers, was transformed into a major arena of
Cold War competition as a result of the growing influence of
developing nations generally.
Brezhnev*s foreign policy goals, independent of
Castro*s aims, were to advance Moscow's strategic and
political power in ways which would exhibit the Soviet
Union's expanding role as a leading global actor, while at
the same' time undermining Western influence in the
region.97

Although Marxist-Leninist ideology legitimized

Soviet expansion in Africa, ideological considerations were
of secondary importance to the Soviets who sought instead to
establish good relations with nations which could
logistically facilitate the Soviet Union's growing air and
naval capabilities.

The Soviets were prepared to extend
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economic and military assistance to well-situated African
states, particularly those in North Africa and along the
coasts, that could be of strategic and political use to
broader Soviet foreign policy aims, particularly the
stemming of Western and Chinese influence among Third World
states and providing a greater Soviet voice in African
affairs.
The emergence of Marxist regimes in Africa in the mid1970s, especially among Portuguese colonies, reflected the
growing popular dissatisfaction with oppressive colonial and
post-colonial governments.

The Soviets attempted to portray

these movements as the natural advent of internal class
struggle which would lead to the global acceptance of
socialism.

One leading Soviet official explained, "the

socialist orientation in Africa is a continuation of the
Cause of the October Revolution under the specific
conditions of its carrying out the high mission of preparing
the way for the victory of scientific socialism."98

Yet

although the Soviets warmly welcomed the growth of AfroMarxism, this ideology was a purely African adaptation of
socialism and should not be viewed as a result of Soviet
influence on the continent.99

Despite Soviet military and
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economic assistance to African states throughout the 1960s
and early 1970s, Soviet activities in Africa bore few
concrete results until 1976 when the Soviet-backed Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) defeated the
U.S.-backed National Front for the Liberation of Angola
(FNLA) following a two year civil war.
Although the Angolan Civil War (1975-1976) represented
the first significant act of Cuban-Soviet cooperation
outside of Latin America, this cooperative effort was not
strictly a result of Soviet initiatives in Africa.

It is

argued that the Cuban government, hoping to extend its own
influence beyond Latin America, set the stage for active
Soviet involvement in the war in Angola.

Cuban support for

Angolan communists and the MPLA began in the 1960s when
/

Castro arranged for the training of MPLA-backed soldiers in
Cuba.

There the soldiers* studies focused on guerrilla

tactics to be used against the Portuguese colonial
government.100

Cuban assistance to the MPLA continued and

expanded to include the deployment of Cuban troops to help
fight the civil war.

By September 1975 more than 20,000

Cubans had been sent to Angola to fight against the FNLA as

African Marxists attempt to apply strict Soviet-style
socialism to the prevailing conditions in Africa. AfroMarxists attempt to mold the principles of Soviet socialism
into a new ideology which adapts to the special conditions
in Africa.
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soldiers and technical advisors.
Soviet support for the MPLA was less consistent as a
result of Soviet caution in supporting untested national
liberation movements as well as previous Soviet failures in
Africa, particularly the replacement of Soviet-backed
regimes in Ghana and Mali with pro-U.S. governments in the
late 1960s.101

Although the Soviet Union began sending

economic assistance to the MPLA before the Cubans had
recognized the movement, the flow of aid was uneven.

The

first disruption of aid occurred in 1963 when the Soviets
temporarily canceled financial assistance to the movement.
Full aid was restored in 1964.

Again in 1972 the Soviet

Union curtailed military aid, partly as a result of
political infighting among the MPLA leadership and partly as
a result of Brezhnev's signing of the Basic Principles
Agreement which "codified" superpower conduct in global
politics.

Although the MPLA survived and Soviet military

aid was revived briefly, the Soviets chose to abandon the
movement in 1974 and focus on improving relations with
leaders in North Africa, including Muhammar al-Qaddafi of
Libya and Anwar Sadat of Egypt.102

Once the colonial

government collapsed and civil war began, the Soviets
resumed both military and financial aid to the movement to
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supplement Cuban assistance.103
The Soviet Union and Cuba committed themselves to the
MPLA at a time when the international system seemed to have
changed.104

The threat of intervention by the United

States was minimal since the U.S. had just been defeated in
Vietnam and American public opinion was strongly opposed to
new military engagements in the Third World.

For the

Soviets, the time seemed right to extend assistance to a
fledgling communist movement in Africa in the hopes of
establishing a loyal regional ally.

The Cubans, who also

sought to project their influence abroad, recognized the war
as an opportunity to prove themselves useful to Soviet
operations in the Third World.

With the inception of the

Angolan Civil War,- the Soviet Union began to depend heavily
on. Cuba as a tool of Soviet foreign policy.

The signing of

the Basic Principles Agreement in June 1974 meant that the
American president and the Soviet premier would consult one
another in the event of an international crisis and that
neither nation would seek unilateral advantage in the event
of a regional crisis in the Third World.105

Therefore, in

order to influence the Angolan crisis without consulting or
involving the United States, Brezhnev decided to take
advantage of the cooperative relationship between Cuba and
103
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the Soviet Union.
Brezhnev entrusted Castro with considerable
responsibility concerning the conduct of the civil war.
However, this was not merely a gesture of good faith on
Brezhnev's part but reflected the Soviet Union's need to
focus its troops and attention on other conflicts.

Since

the Cubans had available troops to send to Angola, the
Soviet was able to focus its attention, resources, and
troops on the growing conflict in Afghanistan.

Although the

Soviets provided significant military counsel, Castro was in
command of the communist forces.

For example, it was

Castro's decision to dramatically increase Cuban troop
deployments to Angola following the arrival of five thousand
South African troops to assist the FNLA in October 1975.
Several hundred Cuban advisors helped to plan strategy for
the MPLA and the largest clash of the civil war involved
Cuban troops representing the MPLA and South African troops
representing the FNLA and the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA).

Approximately two hundred

Cuban troops died during the three day battle.106
Castro's role as the Soviet representative in Angola
continued following the victory of the MPLA forces.

Cuba

maintained a force of 25,000 troops in Angola to help
protect against South African intervention.

In 1984 Angola

and South Africa agreed to negotiate the withdrawal of
106
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foreign troops.

Castro's new status as the Soviet spokesman

in the Third World was obvious as he met with Angolan
officials to outline the terms for foreign troop
withdrawal.107
By the late 1970s Cuba had established its presence
throughout Africa and the Middle East.

Cuban forces abroad

in the late 1970s accounted for two-thirds of the military
and technical personnel stationed by all communist states in
the Third World —

exceeding Soviet troops in Afghanistan

and Vietnamese forces in Southeast Asia.

In addition to

troops, Cuba dispatched advisors, technicians, and
construction workers to Algeria, Iraq, Jamaica, Libya,
Mozambique, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Grenada in the late
1970s and early 1980s.108

By 1979 Cuba was helping to

defend Soviet interests not only in Angola, but also in
Ethiopia, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.
In each of these cases, Cuban and Soviet foreign policy
goals converged as they had in Angola.

The Angolan civil

war proved that Cuba was a reliable ally.

Cuban assistance

to Ethiopian resistance against Somolia (1977-1978) proved
that C uba's aims could be restricted to a single task and
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would not necessarily involve the occupation

of a nation

after the task had been successfully accomplished.

Although

the Cubans acted with considerable autonomy in Angola, in
Ethiopia the Cuban forces were used to augment Soviet forces
backing Ethiopian resistance in a border dispute with
Somalia.

Soviet and Cuban troops acted in unison, though

generally with Soviet leadership and following Soviet
guidelines.109

This was due in part to the fact that the

Soviet Union had a vested interest in Ethiopia because of
its use of the nation as a strategic base.

The Cuban

commitment was considerable, and by early 1978 its presence
had grown to about 12,000 troops.110

As a reward for Cuban

assistance in Ethiopia, the Soviets provided Cuba with
increased economic and military aid and more frequent
shipments of oil, nickel, and other natural resources.
The late 1970s also represented a time of Cuban-Soviet
cooperation in Central America.

Given its geographical

proximity to Nicaragua and El Salvador, Cuba naturally had
greater interest in assisting fledgling communist movements
in those nations.

Cuba had supported national liberation

movements there since the early 1960s, even in the face of
Soviet indignation and banishment from regional alliances
and trade.

However, by the late 1970s, the Soviets

acknowledged Cuba*s ability to effectively represent Soviet
109
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interests in the region.

Although the Soviets still sought

caution when supporting revolutions in the United States'
back yard, Castro desperately wanted to see greater
revolutionary activity throughout Latin America.

When the

revolutions began in Nicaragua (1977-1979) and El Salvador
(1979-1981), the United States tried to prevent the spread
of socialism in Latin America by funding and supplying anti
communist forces there.

The Soviet Union, which saw the

emergence of any communist government in the region as an
important step toward breaking U.S. hegemony in Latin
America, was eager to provide economic and military support
the FSLN because of its professed dedication to MarxistLeninist doctrine and its dedication to Soviet-style
communism.111

As a result, the Soviets provided weapons

and limited logistical support through Cuba, which also
wanted to see the spread of communism in Latin America since
it would translate to potential anti-American allies in the
region.112
Cuba provided the guerrilla forces in both countries,
the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN or
Sandinistas) in Nicaragua and the Popular Forces of
Liberation (FPL) in El Salvador, in an attempt to overthrow
the ruling governments and install socialist regimes.
Nicaragua the Cubans helped train, arm, and transfer an
111
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"internationalist brigade" to fight alongside the FSLN which
was seeking to overthrow the oligarchical regime of General
Anastasio Somoza.

By late 1979 Cuba had sent nearly 3,000

civilians (teachers, doctors, and health care professionals)
to assist the FSLN.

In addition, Cuba provided the

Sandinista movement with over 15,000 military and security
advisors.113

Despite the rebels' victory in Nicaragua, the

Cuban and Soviet assistance should not be overemphasized.
The rebels received considerable assistance from many
nations, including democracies in Latin America (Venezuela,
Mexico, and Costa Rica) who were eager to see an end to the
corrupt regime.
El Salvador's revolution came about under different
circumstances than did Nicaragua's.

In Nicaragua, as in

Cuba, the revolution stemmed from rebels' attempts to seize
control from a dynastic despot.

In El Salvador the struggle

was intended to reform a quasi-democracy which served a
select oligarchy and continuously propagated leaders from
the same social and economic class.

The guerrillas aimed to

overthrow the ruling elite and acquire economic benefits for
the poor.

Cuban assistance to the Salvadoran guerrillas

began ardently.

However, by 1981, the second year of the

war, the Cuban involvement was restricted to military
advisors and irregular weapons shipments due to a reduction
in Soviet financial support for Cuba's activities there..
113

Ibid., 165.

72
Although there was no overthrow of the ruling elite,
the revolution can be categorized as a limited success.

By

1981 the government had initiated political and economic
reforms designed to aid peasant farmers and workers.114
Cuban and Soviet support dropped further following an illfated guerrilla offensive in January 1981.

Following the

guerrilla defeat, the Soviet Union encouraged the small
Communist Party of El Salvador (PCES) to move away from
armed struggle and concentrate on negotiations with the
ruling government.115

Although Castro openly supported the

guerrillas, he could not maintain significant levels of
support without continued Soviet backing.
A major setback to the spread of socialism in Latin
America occurred when Cuban-Soviet domination was ended in
Grenada.

On October 19, 1983 Maurice Bishop, the communist

ruler of Grenada and protege of Castro, was killed following
a coup d'etat.

The leaders of the coup were dissatisfied

members of Bishop's Marxist "New Jewel Movement" who saw
Bishop's anti-American stance weakening.

President Ronald

Reagan, seeking to ensure the safety of 1,000 Americans on
the island and promote the formation of a democratic
government, sent 1,900 troops to the island.

The communist

government was replaced with a democratic system, in which
the communist factions continue to do battle.
114
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was significant since it revealed that the United States was
not willing to allow unchecked Soviet expansion in Latin
America.

Castro, not expecting Soviet military retaliation

against the United States, supported Soviet condemnation of
the invasion.
Throughout this period, the Soviet Union and Cuba,
faced with numerous communist struggles throughout the
world, decided to divide the world into "mini spheres of
influence.”

The Soviets opted to concentrate on crises in

A?ghanistan (begun in 1979) and Poland (begun in 1981).

As

a result, the Cubans were allowed to conduct their wars in
Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, and assume greater
control over communist forces in Ethiopia, with relatively
little Soviet interference.

The Cuban success in Nicaragua

led the Soviet Union to consider more seriously the support
of armed struggle in Latin America.

Scholars, too, began to

reconsider the guerrilla warfare theories once championed by
Che Guevara and guerrilla tactics as a recognized route to
legitimate power lost support.
Although Cuban-Soviet cooperations encouraged new
socialist states, the financial support to ensure their
survival was lacking since neither Cuba nor the Soviet Union
could afford to provide newly established communist regimes
with the amount of economic assistance they sought to
rebuild their economies.

However, the Soviets were eager to

reward Cuba for its cooperation in Latin America and Africa
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and provided Castro with increased arms shipments and
economic assistance, part of which was earmarked for the
promotion of armed struggle in Latin America.116

116
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Chapter Five
The Gorbachev Era: 1985-Present

Cuban-Soviet relations throughout the first three years
of the Mikhail Gorbachev era remained secure and relatively
unchanged.

Castro was careful to maintain good relations

with the Soviet Union as a means of ensuring continued
military and economic assistance.

However, since the

introduction of political and, more importantly, economic
reforms within the Soviet Union, Soviet foreign policy has
become subordinated to the more urgent domestic problems
challenging the stability and unity of the nation.

In an

attempt to revitalize the nation's domestic economy and
reduce economic assistance to Soviet allies, Gorbachev
deemed it necessary to reassess the theory and practice of
past foreign policies.

The result was "new thinking," an

approach which postulates that Soviet policies must be based
in the long run on reasonable cost/benefit analysis and
economic accountability, not on the outdated ideological
formulas that guided past foreign policy.117
The idea of "new thinking" conceptualizes Gorbachev's
117 Jiri Valenta, "'New Thinking' and Soviet Policy in
Latin America," The Washington Quarterly (Spring 1990), 136137.
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call for radical changes to combat the rising costs and
decreasing effectiveness of policies initiated under the
leadership.of Leonid Brezhnev and his predecessors.118

The

Soviet military buildup and international activism of the
late 1970s, particularly the invasion and prolonged
occupation of Afghanistan, backing for the Sandinistas in
Nicaragua, and support for other vanguard party regimes,
depleted Soviet resources and contributed to deepening
economic and social stagnation in the Soviet Union.

This,

combined with growing Western opposition to Soviet
international behavior (as demonstrated by U.S. support for
freedom fighters in Afghanistan and anti-Leninist insurgents
in Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia), prompted Moscow to
reassess its foreign policy goals and strategies.

What

resulted were policies which were intended to initiate or
strengthen state-to-state relations based on western
perceptions of normal international relations, including
trade, economic assistance, and overt military sales to
existing governments.
Gorbachev began by deemphasizing ideology as the
foundation for Soviet foreign policy.

Brezhnev had defended

much of his foreign policy, including the invasion of
Czechoslovakia and subseguent issuing of the Brezhnev
Doctrine in 1968, the invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and
escalation of the Cold War, with Leninist ideology that
118
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justified all efforts to aid the spread of world socialism.
Gorbachev sought to reform Soviet foreign policy and promote
state-to-state relations based on positive economic and
political cooperation.

This would entail the restructuring

of relations with existing allies.
At first, western scholars and analysts doubted
G o r b a c h e v s commitment to reshaping the Soviet Union's
approach to international relations.

Similar pronouncements

of U.S.-Soviet rapprochement and other foreign policy
reforms by earlier Soviet leaders failed to bring about a
more stable international situation.

Therefore, few

westerners recognized that "new thinking" was more than
propaganda and reflected a fundamental change in the Soviet
Union's perception of its role in world affairs.119
In the first few years of Gorbachev's rule, it appeared
that there was no significant shift in the relations between
Moscow and Havana.

In an address before the Third Congress

of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) in February of that
year, Castro offered renewed testimony that Cuba remained
the leading, faithful ally and advocate of the Soviet Union
and its interests.

He claimed that his nation had never

before been stronger militarily and would discharge its
"sacred internationalist duties in accordance with its

119 John Edwin Mroz, "Soviet Foreign Policy and New
Thinking," International Affairs (Moscow) (May 1990), 23.
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abilities.”120

However, during his report before the

Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU, shortly after the PCC
congress, Gorbachev failed to mention the Kremlin's
traditional pledge of support for "wars of national
liberation" of the type witnessed,throughout the Third World
and forcefully advocated by Castro.121

Instead, Gorbachev

asserted that global problems affecting the way people live
and the very existence of the planet must carry greater
urgency and importance than the problems of any one class or
the promotion of any one ideology.122

He called for

support for renewed detente with the west, arguing that non
violence and mutual cooperation would better ensure an
improved international climate and the future of the Soviet
Union.

He defended his position and refuted the belief,

maintained by Khrushchev and Brezhnev, that peaceful
coexistence with imperial, capitalist nations (namely the
United States and western European nations) was useful only
as a prolonged tactic to postpone, but not prevent, the
inevitable confrontation between the capitalist and
communist worlds.
Gorbachev's failure to pledge support for wars of
national liberation and his efforts to encourage greater
120 R. Bruce McColm, "Castro's Ambitions Amid New Winds
from Moscow," Strategic Review (Summer 1986), 48.
121
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122 Serg Mikoyan, "Soviet Foreign Policy and Latin
America," The Washington Quarterly (Summer 1990), 180.

socialist cooperation with capitalist nations drew sharp
criticism from Castro.

In 1986 the Cuban Communist Party

“published a platform paper entitled "Principles and
Objectives of Foreign Policy.”

The paper pledged Castro's

and the party's abiding support for revolutionary movements
around the world and vowed to work toward unity among
diverse forces that are part of the international
revolutionary process.

The paper reiterated Castro's

internationalist commitment, saying "the [Cuban] party and
people will continue to fulfill honorably their
internationalist duties, exercising solidarity with the
peoples who are struggling for their independence and
national liberation.”123
Castro's unwillingness to accept Soviet "new thinking"
may be explained in two ways.

First, Castro has always

maintained that a U.S.-Soviet rapprochement would increase
the chances of an American invasion of Cuba.

As he saw it,

stronger ties between the Soviet Union and the West would
weaken the Soviet commitment to its Third World allies,
especially Cuba.

Although many analysts argue that the

threat and feasibility of direct American intervention has
diminished considerably since the 1960s, Castro believes
r

that the U.S. government would welcome any type of coup,
\

whether organized from within Cuba or sponsored by Cuban

123 R. Bruce McColm, "Castro's Ambitions Among New
Winds from Moscow," Strategic Review (Summer 1986), 48-49.
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exiles in the United States and South America.124
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second explanation reflects Castro's commitment to the
revolution and the legitimacy his government derives from |
that commitment.

Support for revolution is a constitutive

ideological dimension of the Cuban revolution.

It validates

Castro's regime at home and augments his influence
abroad.125

Violence —

conventional and guerrilla -- has

been the fuel of his power ^nd prestige.
By 1987 Gorbachev began to mesh "new thinking" and
perestroika, Soviet plans for domestic economic reform, by
calling for significant economic reform, including the
expansion of trade to include non socialist nations and the
solicitation of economic assistance and trade credit from
Western Europe, from its economically dependant allies,
particularly members of the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CMEA).

However, Castro argued that the economic

reforms associated with perestroika were not a precondition
for "new thinking" elsewhere than in the Soviet Union.

He

maintained that the acceptance of worker incentive programs
and market-oriented management of industry would betray the
people of Cuba.

Castro called for "rectification" of the

Cuban economy —

a return to a more doctrinaire Marxism that

rejects material incentives as well as profit and private

124 "Castro's Future," Niohtline (ABC News, Show No.
2298), March 14, 1990, 4-5.
125
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Although Castro, was unwilling to accept market reforms

as proposed by the Soviets, he recognized t:he need for some
reforms to remedy poor economic planning and bureaucratic
inefficiency.

He agreed to implement certain Soviet-style

reforms that reflected modernization and economic selfdiscipline, but asserted that he was firmly opposed to the
mixture of socialism and capitalism since the two systems
are based on very different approaches to society and
economics.

In December 1986 he argued:

Apparently we [socialists] thought that by
dressing a person up as a capitalist we were going
to achieve efficient production in the factory and
so...we started to play at being capitalists....
When there’s no competition, if the motivation
prompting the owner in a capitalist society to
defend his personal interests is out of the
question, what is there to substitute for this?
Only the cadres' individual sense of
responsibility, not just the collective's sense of
responsibility, the role played by the cadres.
The man who is in charge there must be a

126 Michael Kline, "Castro and 'New Thinking' in Latin
America," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs
(Spring 1990), 97.
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Communist...A revolutionary!127
Castro vowed to withstand Soviet warnings to reform the
Cuban economy, including threats that Gorbachev was planning
far-reaching and significant cuts in economic and military
assistance to its socialist allies.

Although Castro

recognized the need to prepare for such cuts in aid, he was
unable to reconcile Soviet-style reforms and Cuban-style
Communism.

He explained, "We [Cubans] will never renounce

the glorious title of Socialists and Communists.

We have

hard-working people fully dedicated to the task of dealing
with problems, dedicated to advancing the Party and the
Revolution.

The Party will not at any time stop being

called the Communist Party of Cuba."128
By 1987 Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union
planned to reduce military aid to most allies outside of
Eastern Europe.

Cuban arms imports, which totaled $2.1

billion in 1985, dropped to $1.8 billion,J.n~,ia87.129

This

reduction, believed, in part, to be a reaction to Castro's
negative assessment of shifts in Soviet policy, led some
analysts to suspect that Gorbachev would resort to economic

127 R. Rabkin, "Implications of the Gorbachev Era for
Cuban Socialism,” Studies in Comparative Communism (Vol. 23,
no. 1, Spring 1990), 39.
128 Ron Chepesiuk, "Castro Against the Tide,”
Leader (January 8, 1990), 10.

The New

129 Jan S. Adams, "Change and Continuity in Soviet
Central American Policy,” Problems of Communism (March-June
1989), 113.
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pressure to bring Castro into conformity with his reforms.
Gorbachev maintained that these reductions were motivated by
economic necessity and that changes in Soviet military and
economic assistance to its allies should not be interpreted
as signs of displeasure with them.130
During a brief visit to Cuba in April 1989, Gorbachev
faced veiled criticism of perestroika and "new thinking” by
Casbrof but publicly renewed his commitment to Cuba by
signing a Treaty of Friendship between the two nations.
However, within months of Gorbachev*s visit to Cuba, Soviet
deliveries of petroleum and building supplies were delayed
without any official explanation or apology.131

Castro

began to speak publicly of a possible decline in economic
assistance from the Soviet Union.

Soviet spokesmen flatly

denied that the delays were a tactical maneuver to force.
Castro to reconsider his opposition to Gorbachev's reforms,
but emphasized that the economic arrangement between Cuba
and the Soviet Union was not compatible with reforms taking
place in the Soviet Union and restructuring would be
necessary.132
Cuba faced the gravest threat to its economy following

130
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131 Joseph B. Treaster, "Castro Begins to Talk of
Decline in Crucial Aid from Soviet Union," New York Times
(July 28, 1989), A2.
132 Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Castro's Nightmare," Washington
Post (February 27, 1990), A23.
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the collapse of the Soviet Union's East European satellites
and the subsequent breakdown of the CMEA.

Most of the

social progress that Castro provided Cuba was accomplished
at the cost of enormous foreign debts and reliance on trade
subsidies secured through Cuba's "most favored nation"
status within the CMEA.

Since 1972, beneficial trade

agreements with CMEA states have served as insurance against
Cuban economic collapse.

Cuba became excessively dependent

on "soft" CMEA trade, which was conducted on a barter basis
rather than in hard currency.

But as the Central and East

European members adopted market-oriented economies, they
abandoned subsidized trade with Cuba.

This left Castro to

rely even more heavily on Soviet trade subsidies, most of
which were scheduled to end by 1991.133
Castro's reaction to the collapse of Cuba's subsidized
trade arrangements was to reaffirm Cuba's commitment to
socialism.

He accepted the right of Eastern European

nations to shift to market economies and told a gathering of
international journalists, "If a socialist country wants to
construct capitalism, then we have to respect this right."
He added, however, that socialism "is [Cuba's] policy and
there can be no other way? history makes it so."134
It is clear that Gorbachev's policy changes are not
133 Eugene Robinson, "Castro: Let World Change, Cuba
Will Stay the Course," Washington Post (March 17, 1990),
A21.
134
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intended to imperil the Soviet Union*s relationships with

Cuba, or any other nation.

The Soviets desire continued

positive relations with Cuba and other traditional allies,
but are convinced that significant political and economic
restructuring within the Soviet Union, as well as stronger
ties with non-traditional allies, is necessary to the
maintenance of Soviet socialism.

It is unintended

concurrence, however, that these changes are altering, and
often jeopardizing, the influence of the Soviet Union over
its allies.

Such is the case with Cuba.

The Soviet Union truly desires to keep Cuba within its
camp.

The relationship which former Soviet leaders built

with Castro continues to serve the objectives of the Soviet
Union today.135

Militarily, Cuba provides the Soviets with

an electronic surveillance base at Lourdes for the
collection of intelligence data, it provides a military air
base from which the Soviet Union can launch reconnaissance
flights along the eastern shores of the United States, and
it allows for Soviet naval use of the shipyards at
Cienfuegos.

In addition Cuba, which enjoys a popular

socialist government and health and human services that
surpass those of other developing nations, has long
represented the potential positive aspects of socialism to
Latin American and other Third World nations.
Although the Soviets are encouraging Cuba to adapt to
135
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changing conditions in (and benefits from) the Soviet Union,
Castro does not view the Soviet model as compatible with
Cuba's economic strategy.

His most frequent argument

against reforms proposed by the Soviets is that the
introduction of limited market-oriented mechanisms to Cuba's
socialist economy would undermine the progress of the Cuban
Revolution.

However, he faces the realization that reforms

in the Soviet Union are also likely to have an impact on
Cuba, its economy, and, eventually, the success of the
revolution.
Castro fears that a sustained decline in Soviet
military aid to Cuba threatens the unity of Cuba's military
and its ability to defend itself from U.S. intervention, a
more feasible threat if Cuba's defenses are compromised as a
result of cuts in military aid.

Following the recent

withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola after a year of
military stalemate, morale is low.

If Castro cannot secure

continued funding or employment for his returning troops,
once content officers may try to overthrow the current order
and stability.136
Castro, however, continues to promote the old-line
ideas and rhetoric, including the offering of encouragement
to the remaining socialist movements throughout Latin
America.

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union's

Eastern European satellites, Castro initiated a new wave of
136
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veiled anti-Soviet rhetoric.

He argued, "the crisis in the

Soviet bloc was the result of a long-term imperialist
strategy of undermining socialism from within, compounded by
'some errors* that may have been committed.1,137
The Cuban response to Soviet calls for economic and
political reforms has been to turn a deaf ear.

The Soviets,

concerned with the increasing economic and political
problems within their own borders, have responded with
gentle persuasion and continued cuts in military assistance.
There has been a clear and seemingly irreparable ideological
rift in Cuban-Soviet relations.

However, the Soviet Union

cannot be expected to maintain Castro as a relic of
communism.

Gorbachev must concentrate on the reform of his

own nation*s economy.

Soon he will be forced to make

drastic cuts in Soviet economic aid to Cuba.

While this

could endanger Cuban-Soviet relations, it must be realized
that Gorbachev fundamental role as president is to ensure
and protect the survival of the Soviet Union.

Although Cuba

is a beneficial ally, the need to stabilize the Soviet
economy outweighs the need to maintain a strong network of
allies which serves only the expansionist policies of the
Soviet Union.

Gorbachev*s 'new thinking* defines the

survival of the nation as the driving force of Soviet
foreign policy.
Although Castro’s popularity within Cuba leads many
137
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analysts to believe that he could easily win a free
election, he cannot justify reforms which would directly
conflict with his actions as leader of the revolution.

He

has enjoyed over thirty years as the leading voice of
communism in the Third World with Soviet backing.

In many

ways, the loosening of bonds with the Soviets allows Castro
to move forward with his dream to prove himself as the
leading independent spokesman for communism in the Third
World.

If Cuba were to follow the path of reforms to the

extent witnessed in Eastern Europe, it would indicate to the
Cuban people that Castro was abandoning the revolution and
socialist ideals which served to legitime his rule since
1959.

And it seems doubtful that Castro, who clings to the

now somewhat fading image of his revolution, will be able to
make the visionary, but risky, leap into the reality of 'new
thinking' and embark on a domestic reform, like the Soviets,
to improve Cuba's image and ensure its role as a leader
among developing nations.

Conclusion

The previous review of Cuban-Soviet relations since
1959 clearly demonstrates the close alliance that developed
between the two nations and left Cuba economically and
militarily dependant on Soviet support.

However, this

dependance was a calculated risk which Castro was willing to
take in order to ensure the physical security of his nation,
the success of his government's social programs, and the
promotion of Cuba as an influential actor in international
politics.

And despite the many just criticisms charged

against Castro's regime, including human rights violations,
deception and censorship, and international terrorism, it
has succeeded at providing the nation with security and
relative comfort at home and an influential voice as the
most enduring socialist nation in the Third World.
Although Cuba historically was seen as vulnerable to
U.S. military and economic aggression, Castro used close
ties with the Soviet Union to secure political and economic
independence from the United States.

With massive Soviet

assistance, genuine socio-economic and political
accomplishments have been achieved, including a highly
egalitarian redistribution of income, major advances in the
89
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areas of education and technical training, and the
establishment of a national health care system superior to
similar programs in most developed nations.

Castro's

alliance with the Soviet Union and international communism
has afforded Cuba a disproportionate amount of world
attention and influence for a nation of its size and limited
resources.

And although Castro has tolerated Soviet

interference in many areas of its econpmic and political
affairs, Cuban "internationalism" has regularly reflected
the government's commitment to maintaining a foreign policy
independent of Soviet domination.
Because of Cuba's economlc_and_jmilitary dependence, on
the Soviet Union, scholars and analysts have tended to
overemphasize the degree of leverage the Soviet Union exerts
over Cuba.

Both the "Sovietization of Cuba Thesis" and the

'?Surrogate Thesis" contend that by allowing Cuba to become
dependent upon Soviet assistance, Castro forfeited his
nation's autonomy and made Cuba a surrogate of Soviet
directives.

I argue that each of these theses neglects the

frequent divergence between Cuban and Soviet policies
regarding key issues.

Similarly, the theses fail to

consider that Castro's willingness to conform with Soviet
policy in other areas could simply be the result of balanced
and informed consideration of his government's options.
Cuba is clearly a friendly ally of the Soviet Union and it
is to be expected that such allies will attempt to
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coordinate policy on important issues.

Although the Soviet

Union has used its economic and military assistance to Cuba
to exert influence over Castro's government, I allege that
Cuban-Soviet relations exemplify those of two nations
pursuing compatible interests.
Proven cases of assertive or coercive power by the
Soviet Union over Castro are rare.

One clear example,

detailed in chapter two, occurred in 1967-68 when the
Soviets cut back oil supplies to Cuba in an attempt to
coerce Castro to suspend his emphasis on armed struggle in
the Third World.

But even then, what compelled the Cubans

to shift to the pro-Soviet line of peaceful change was a
number of other domestic and regional forces, including the
death of Che Guevara in Bolivia, the lack of success among
Latin American guerrilla movements, and increasing problems
with production and workers' strife in Cuba.138

Therefore,

it would be inaccurate to portray Soviet sanctions against
Cuba as the only factor contributing to Castro's change of
policy.
The "Sovietization Thesis'* points to Cuba's membership
in the CMEA and Castro's willingness to restructure the
nation's economic institutions to parallel those of the
Soviet Union as examples of the Soviets exerting undue
influence over Cuba.

It maintains that such moves furnished

the Soviet Union with exorbitant leverage with which it
138
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could control the Cuban economy and pressure Castro to
conform with Soviet policies.

However, it cannot be ignored

that Castro actively pursued membership in the CMEA and was
fully aware of the potential risks and benefits from
economic restructuring.

The arrangement formalized Cuban

trade with the Soviet Union and other CMEA member states,
thereby ensuring stable markets for Cuban exports and
providing continued supplies of necessary imports.

During

the first decade of Cuban membership in the CMEA, trade with
socialist nations rose considerably from 65.2 percent in
1974 to 87 percent by 1984.139
The central premise of the "Sovietization Thesis” is
that the relationship between Castro's Cuba and the Soviet
Union resembles the relationship that existed between prerevolutionary Cuba and the United States.

Before the

revolution, Cuba's relationship with the United States was
characterized by an era of U.S. imperialism followed by an
era of U.S. hegemony.140

From 1898, the year Spain ceded

Cuba to the United States, to 1934, the year the Platt
Amendment was abrogated, the U.S. maintained control over
political and economic developments in Cuba.

During these

years, the United States directed the actions of the Cuban
government and readily seized control of the government and
139 Frank T. Fitzgerald, "The 'Sovietization of Cuba
Thesis' Revisited,” Science and Society (Vol. 51, no. 4,
Winter 1987-1988), 443.
140
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occupied the island when U.S. directives were not followed.
Once Cuba had been molded to serve American interests, the
Platt Amendment was repealed and the U.S. sought only to
ensure the security of the island and protect U.S. firms
doing business there.

Trade between the two nations was

normal and, although the U.S. maintained Naval bases on the
island, no measures were taken to establish an unusually
large American military presence on Cuba.

However, Cuban

foreign policy up to the revolution was always expected to
conform with U.S. interests in the region.
The relationship between Castro’s Cuba and the Soviet
Union is very different.

The "Sovietization Thesis" assumes

rather than demonstrates the existence of Soviet coercion.
Since the establishment of political and economic ties,
Castro has enjoyed considerable independence from Soviet
pressure and has frequently pursued policies which directly
conflicted with Soviet aims.

There is reason to believe

that the Cubans maintain considerable leverage in their
dealings with the Soviets and that the Cuban-Soviet
relationship is one of negotiated give and take.141

For

example, Cuba was able to solicit overt Soviet support for
its activities in Angola, Nicaragua, and El Salvador,
despite the Soviet Union’s official curtailment of such
support.

The results of Cuba's intervention in Africa and

the success of the Cuban-backed Sandinistas in El Salvador
141 - F. T. Fitzgerald, 447.
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influenced the Soviet Union to moderate temporarily its
opposition to armed struggle.

Because of his significant

leverage in the Nonaligned Movement, Castro has acquired the
unofficial role of Soviet spokesman to the Third World,
particularly to Latin America.

However, Cuba's sacrifices^

to ensure economic stability and a strong voice in the
socialist world have proven costly, if not detrimental.
Cuba's failure to establish economic relations with
most non-CMEA nations has left the island vulnerable to
financial ruin as a result of the collapse of CMEA trade and
the announcement by the Soviets of cuts in military and
economic assistance to dependant allies.

These events along

with Castro's frequent criticism of Gorbachev's reform
policies, have led many analysts to predict an end to
friendly relations between the two nations.

They argue that

the two approaches to socialism are no longer reconcilable
and, without the benefits of Soviet economic assistance,
Castro has no incentive to accommodate Gorbachev's 'new
thinking.'

However, even if the Soviet Union were to cut

off completely economic assistance to Cuba, Castro could
continue to profit from its relationship with the Soviet
Union.
Because Cuba had focused its foreign economic policy on
subsidized trade with CMEA nations, the Soviet Union remains
one of the few nations with which it can be assured of
continued trade, albeit on less favorable terms.

Gorbachev
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has vowed to provide Cuba with $450 million in aid and hard
currency loans to see it through the immediate crisis.142
If Castro is willing to accept economic relations with
capitalist nations, a key tenet of 'new thinking,* then the
Soviets would conceivably seek to maintain Cuba's economic
viability thus far by continuing to provide Castro with
technical assistance and economic advisors.

More

importantly, expanded trade with capitalist nations could
help to safeguard Cuba's educational, health, and welfare
systems, the success of which fosters public support for
Castro's regime.
Acceptance of "new thinking" could also serve to
preserve Castro's influence abroad, influence which he
derives from Cuba's unique relationship with the Soviet
Union.

Cuban foreign policy has as its goals "to hold power

and leverage in the international system, to remain
independent of the United States, to support insurgencies,
and to promote diplomatic relations."143

According to

Michael Kline and other scholars, none of these goals,
including support for insurgencies, is necessarily
inconsistent with 'new thinking.1144

In recent years

Castro has been willing to use diplomatic measures to pursue
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many of Cuba*s foreign policy aims, including the
undermining of U.S. economic and political pressure against
Cuba.

A recent example of this policy occurred in 1989 when

Cuba garnered the support of Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia,
Peru, and Mexico to defeat a U.S.-sponsored resolution in
the United Nations condemning Cuba for human rights
violations.145

Castro*s declaration in January 1989

insisted that "there should be no doubt whatsoever that we
fully support the Soviet Union's peace policy."146
Although Soviet Union is willing to sacrifice its
relationship with Cuba if Cuban-Soviet relations threaten to
jeopardize "new thinking," it too stands to lose many
benefits.

Cuba continues to serve as the Soviet Union's

primary bridge to the Third World.

It serves as an example

of a nation that willingly adopted and preserved socialism
and Marxist-Leninist teachings.

And it acts as a base of

support for future communist movements in Latin America.
More practically, Soviet bases and intelligence
installations on Cuba would be irreplaceable due to the
island's strategic location.

Because of these benefits, it

is feasible that the Soviet Union will work to retain Cuba
as a socialist ally and would make whatever concessions are
economically possible to keep Cuba as an eager defender of
Soviet policies.
145
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As has been reflected throughout the history of CubanSoviet relations, any solution to this conflict will
necessitate compromise by both sides.

Each nation has

benefitted from the relationship and each stands to lose
considerable interests if the alliance folds.

It is

plausible that, in order to preserve stability at home and
influence abroad, Castro will accept changes in Soviet
policy while asserting his traditional brand of communism
and beliefs.

In return, the Soviets will promise to honor

its military alliance with Cuba and work to maintain limited
economic assistance and trade agreements that benefit Cuba.
These actions will allow each nation to safeguard
traditional benefits while independently pursuing better
relations with other nations.
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